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James Kirk & Son 1886) [hereinafter MINUTES, DELAWARE COUNCIL]; PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF THE DELAWARE STATE 1781–1792 AND OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1792 (Claudia L. Bushman, Harold B. Hancock, & Elizabeth Moyne Homsey
eds., 1988) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS, DELAWARE ASSEMBLY].
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1776 TO 1786 (Newark, Newark Daily Advertiser Office 1848) [hereinafter N. J. SELECTIONS].
New York: DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(E.B. O’Callaghan et al. eds., 1855) [hereinafter N.Y. RECORDS]; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (E.B. O’Callaghan, 1849) [hereinafter N.Y. HISTORY].
Pennsylvania: MINUTES OF THE SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA (Samuel
Hazard ed., 1853) [hereinafter PA. RECORDS]; 1 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (John Dunlap ed., 1782) [hereinafter PA.
JOURNALS]; MINUTES OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 1785) [hereinafter MINUTES,
PA. ASSEMBLY]; MINUTES OF THE SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA (Harrisburg,
Theo. Fenn & Co. 1853) [hereinafter MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL]; 10 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES
(Samuel Hazard ed., Philadelphia, Joseph Severns & Co. 1854) [hereinafter PA. ARCHIVES].
Rhode Island: RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN
NEW ENGLAND (John Russell Bartlett ed., Providence, A. Crawford Greene 1862, 1963, 1864)
[hereinafter R.I. RECORDS].
United States: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford, Gaillard Hunt, & Roscoe R. Hill eds., 1904–1936) [hereinafter J. CONT. CONG.].
Other collections
AMERICAN ARCHIVES, FIFTH SERIES (Peter Force ed., 1853) [hereinafter AMERICAN ARCHIVES].
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jensen, John
P. Kaminski, & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1976–2012) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
1, 2 & 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
INDIAN TREATIES PRINTED BY BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (Carl Van Doren & Julian P. Boyd eds.,
1938) [hereinafter FRANKLIN, INDIAN TREATIES].
2, 3, 4 & 5 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Edmund C. Burnett ed.,
1921) [hereinafter LETTERS].
THE PAPERS OF JOSIAH BARTLETT (Frank C. Mevers ed., 1979) [hereinafter BARTLETT PAPERS].
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONVENTION OF DELEGATES FROM SEVERAL OF THE NEW-ENGLAND STATES,
HELD AT BOSTON, AUGUST 3–9, 1780 (Franklin B. Hough ed., Albany, J. Munsell 1867)
[hereinafter BOSTON PROCEEDINGS].
Books and Articles
Simeon E. Baldwin, The New Haven Convention of 1778, reprinted in THREE HISTORICAL
PAPERS READ BEFORE THE NEW HAVEN COLONY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 33 (New Haven, Tuttle,
Morehouse & Taylor 1882) [hereinafter Baldwin].
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE
L.J. 957 (1963) [hereinafter Black].
WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo
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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE CONFUSION
The United States Constitution authorizes two methods by which
amendments may be proposed for ratification: (1) by a two thirds
majority of each house of Congress or (2) by a “Convention for
proposing Amendments,” which Congress is required to call upon
receiving applications from two thirds of the state legislatures.2
Press, Da Capo Press Reprint ed. 1970) (1905) [hereinafter BROWN].
RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY
NATIONAL CONVENTION (1988) [hereinafter CAPLAN].
THE FEDERALIST (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund, Gideon ed. 2001)
[hereinafter THE FEDERALIST].
THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY (Francis Jennings et al. eds, 1985)
[hereinafter IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY].
Scott Lillard, The Cement of Interest: Interstate Canals and the Transition from the Articles of
Confederation to the Constitution, 1783–1787 (2012) (on file with author). Robert G. Natelson,
Amending the Constitution by Convention: A More Complete View of the Founders’ Plan
(Independence Institute, Working Paper No. IP-7-2010, 2010) [hereinafter Natelson, Founders’
Plan], available at http://constitution.i2i.org/files/2010/12/IP _7_2010_a.pdf.
Robert G. Natelson, Amending the Constitution by Convention: Lessons for Today from the
Constitution’s First Century, (Independence Institute, Working Paper No. IP-5-2011, 2011)
[hereinafter Natelson, First Century], available at http://liberty.i2i.org/files/2012/03/IP_5_2011
_c.pdf.
Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules Governing the
Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693 (2011) [hereinafter Natelson, Rules].
ROBERT C. NEWBOLD, THE ALBANY CONGRESS AND PLAN OF UNION OF 1754 (1955) [hereinafter
NEWBOLD].
CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966) [hereinafter ROSSITER].
Benjamin Rush, Historical Notes of Dr. Benjamin Rush, 1777, 27 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
129 (1903) (comp. S. Weir Mitchell) [hereinafter Rush, Notes].
Kenneth Scott, Price Control in New England During the Revolution, 19 NEW ENG. Q. 453
(1946).
TIMOTHY J. SHANNON, INDIANS AND COLONISTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF EMPIRE: THE ALBANY
CONGRESS OF 1754 (2000) [hereinafter SHANNON].
Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention
to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, Statement Before the Committee on Ways and
Means of the California State Assembly (Feb. 1, 1979), reprinted in 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979)
[hereinafter Tribe].
HARRY M. WARD, UNITE OR DIE: INTERCOLONY RELATIONS 1690-1763 (1971) [hereinafter
WARD]
C.A. WESLAGER, THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS (1776) (hereinafter WESLAGER).
2. The relevant language is as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed
by the Congress. . . .
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Although state legislatures have applied repeatedly, at no time has the
necessary minimum of two thirds been reached on any one topic, so
Congress has never called an amendments convention.
In recent decades, commentators have expressed uncertainty about
the scope of an amendments convention, the effectiveness of limits on
its charge, how delegates should be selected, and who should determine
its operative rules.3 They also have posed the question of whether it is
essentially (to use James Madison’s dichotomy)4 a “national” or a
“federal” body. In other words, is it a national assembly elected by the
people and presumably apportioned by population? Or is it an assembly
of delegates representing the states?5
Many of these questions arise because of a general failure to
examine sufficiently the history behind and surrounding Article V. For
example, the late Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. of Yale Law School
concluded that an amendments convention is a “national” rather than
“federal” body.6 He deduced this conclusion without referring to
anything the Founders had to say on the matter and while under the
misimpression that the only relevant precedent was the 1787
Constitutional Convention.7 Other questions derive from the ahistorical
error of assuming that an amendments convention is the same thing as a
constitutional convention,8 despite clear historical differences between
the two.9
U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
3. E.g., Tribe, supra note 1, at 634–40. Some commentators argue that Congress should
decide all or some of those questions. See, e.g., Samuel J. Ervin, Proposed Legislation to
Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 879,
892 (1968).
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 1, at 196–99 (James Madison).
5. E.g., Black, supra note 1, at 964–65.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional
Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 738 (1993) (“[T]here can be no
such thing as a ‘limited’ constitutional convention. A constitutional convention, once called, is a
free agency.”).
9. In a nutshell, the difference is as follows: a constitutional convention is a body that
drafts an entirely new constitution, often (although not always) outside any pre-existing
constitutional structure. Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 5–7. An amendments
convention meets pursuant to the Constitution and is essentially a drafting committee for
determining the language of amendments addressing subjects identified in the state legislative
applications. Id.; see also Ann Stuart Diamond, A Convention for Proposing Amendments: The
Constitution’s Other Method, 11 PUBLIUS 113, 137 (“An Article V convention could propose
one or many amendments, but it is not for the purpose of ‘an unconditional reappraisal of
constitutional foundations.’ Persisting to read Article V in this way, so that it contemplates a
constitutional convention that writes—not amends—a constitution, is often a rhetorical ploy to
terrify sensible people.” (footnote omitted)). Confusion between the two first arose in the
nineteenth century, sowed by opponents of the process. See Natelson, First Century, supra note
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What nearly all commentators have overlooked10 is that the Framers
did not write, nor did the Ratifiers adopt, Article V on a blank slate.
They wrote and ratified against the background of a long tradition of
multi-colony and multi-state conventions. During the century before the
drafting of Article V, there had been at least 32 such gatherings—at
least 21 before Independence11 and another eleven between 1776 and
1786.12 In addition, there had been several abortive, although still
instructive, convention calls. These multi-government gatherings were
the direct predecessors of the convention for proposing amendments,
and formed the model upon which the convention for proposing
amendments was based.
Universally-accepted protocols determined multi-government
convention procedures. These protocols fixed the acceptable ways of
calling such conventions, selecting and instructing delegates, adopting
convention rules, and conducting convention proceedings. The actors
involved in the process—state legislatures and executives, the
Continental and Confederation Congresses, and the delegates
themselves—each had recognized prerogatives and duties, and were
subject to recognized limits.13
These customs are of more than mere Founding-Era historical
interest. They governed, for the most part, multi-state conventions held
in the nineteenth century as well—notably but not exclusively, the
Washington Conference Convention of 1861.14 More importantly for
present purposes, they shaped the Founders’ understanding of how the
constitutional language would be interpreted and applied.
Moreover, the Constitution, as a legal document, must be understood
in the context of the jurisprudence of the time. In that jurisprudence,
custom was a key definer of the “incidents” or attributes that
accompanied principal (i.e., express) legal concepts and powers.15 Thus,
1, at 10. Today it is rampant in the legal literature and other areas of public discourse. See, e.g.,
Tribe, supra note 1 (calling an amendments convention a “constitutional convention”).
10. Russell L. Caplan is an important exception. See CAPLAN, supra note 1.
11. Infra Part II.A (listing conventions).
12. Infra Part III.C–III.O (listing and discussing post-Independence convention).
13. Infra Part III.
14. The Washington Conference Convention was a gathering of 21 states called by
Virginia in an effort to propose a constitutional amendment that would avoid the Civil War. See
ROBERT GRAY GUNDERSON, OLD GENTLEMEN’S CONVENTION: THE WASHINGTON PEACE
CONFERENCE OF 1861 (1961). This convention followed eighteenth century convention protocol
virtually to the letter. See, e.g., id. at 48 (describing “one state, one vote” rule). See also THELMA
JENNINGS, THE NASHVILLE CONVENTION: SOUTHERN MOVEMENT FOR UNITY, 1848–1850 (1980)
(describing the nine-state Nashville Convention of 1850, which followed the same voting rule).
Id. at 137–38.
15. The Founding-Era law of principals and incidents and its implication for constitutional
interpretation are discussed in Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I.
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the customs by which the founding generation initiated and conducted
interstate conventions tell us how an Article V convention should be
initiated and conducted; further, they help define the powers and
prerogatives of the actors in the process. But beyond that, there is
considerable affirmative evidence that the Founders specifically
understood these customs to define the language of Article V. These
practices enable us to re-capture the constitutional meaning of the terms
“Application,” “call,” and “Convention for proposing Amendments.”16
Part I of this Article explains why the Founders inserted the
convention method for proposing amendments into the Constitution.
Part II introduces the early-American convention tradition and some of
its terminology. Part III summarizes the protocols for fourteen multicolony and multi-state conventions held between 1754 and 1787, and
also discusses the procedures employed for calling several abortive
conventions. Part IV collects the evidence showing that the established
protocols inhere in Article V. Part IV also explains that the Constitution
specifies rules for the few cases in which there were procedural
variations. The discussion concludes with an explanation of how the
practice surrounding the predecessor conventions impacts the rules for
amendments conventions today. Two Appendices follow, the first
listing alphabetically the delegates to the fourteen conventions
examined in detail, and the second listing the same delegates by state.
I. WHY THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES A PROPOSING CONVENTION AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSAL
Article V grants powers17 to two principal sorts of assemblies:
legislatures, both state and federal; and conventions, both state and
federal. It assigns in-state conventions the task of ratifying or rejecting
the Constitution itself18 and (when Congress so determines) the task of
ratifying or rejecting proposed amendments.19 Article V assigns to a
general convention power to propose amendments.20
The initial draft of the Constitution, composed by the Committee of
Detail, provided that “This Constitution ought to be amended whenever
such Amendment shall become necessary; and on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, the Legislature of

SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 60–68 (2010).
16. U.S. CONST. art. V.
17. The assemblies designated in Article V exercise “federal functions” derived from the
Constitution. State legislatures and conventions do not exercise reserved powers pursuant to the
Tenth Amendment. Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 703 (collecting cases).
18. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
19. Id. art. V.
20. Id.; see infra note 63 and accompanying text on the meaning of “general convention.”
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the United States shall call a Convention for that Purpose.”21 In other
words, the states would trigger a process requiring Congress to call a
convention, which in turn would draft, and possibly adopt, all
amendments. Gouverneur Morris successfully proposed permitting
Congress, as well as the states, to initiate the amendment process.22
When the document emerged from the Committee of Style, it appeared
to give Congress exclusive power to propose amendments for state
ratification.23 George Mason then objected because he feared Congress
might become abusive or refuse to adopt necessary or desirable
amendments, particularly those curbing its own power.24 For this
reason, the draft was changed to insert the convention for proposing
amendments to enable the states to propose amendments without a
substantive veto by Congress.25 The immediate inspiration for the
application procedure seems to have been a provision in the Georgia
constitution whereby a majority of counties could demand amendments
on designated topics, and require the legislature to call a convention to
draft the language.26
It was well for the Constitution that the state application and
convention procedure was added. Without it, the document may never
have been ratified. This is because many believed the Constitution could
lead to congressional abuse and overreaching, and that Congress would

21. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 159.
22. Id. at 468 (Aug. 30, 1787); see also id. at 558 (Sept. 10, 1787) (“The National
Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of
amendments. . . .” (quoting Alexander Hamilton)).
23. Id. at 578 (Aug. 30, 1787) (“The Legislature of the United States, whenever two thirds
of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of
the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution . . . .”).
24. The record, paraphrasing George Mason, stated:
As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend, in the first
immediately, and in the second, ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the
proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should
become oppressive, as [Mason] verily believed would be the case.
Id. at 629 (Sept. 15, 1787).
25. See id. at 629–30.
26. Georgia’s constitution provided that:
No alteration shall be made in this constitution without petitions from a
majority of the counties . . . at which time the assembly shall order a
convention to be called for that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made,
according to the petitions preferred to the assembly by the majority of the
counties as aforesaid.
GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII. The Committee of Detail’s draft convention looked
much like the Georgia provision. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 188.
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be unlikely to curb itself.27 The state application and convention
procedure of Article V provided the Constitution’s advocates with a
basis for arguing that the system was a balanced one,28 and that
Congress could be bypassed, if appropriate.29 Illustrative are comments
by the widely-read Federalist essayist Tench Coxe:
It has been asserted, that the new constitution, when
ratified, would be fixed and permanent, and that no
alterations or amendments, should those proposed appear
on consideration ever so salutary, could afterwards be
obtained. A candid consideration of the constitution will
shew [sic] this to be a groundless remark. It is provided, in
the clearest words, that Congress shall be obliged to call a
convention on the application of’ two thirds of the
legislatures; and all amendments proposed by such
convention, are to be valid when approved by the
conventions or legislatures of three fourths of the states. It
27. An Old Whig I, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 376–77 (”[W]e shall never find two thirds of a
Congress voting or proposing anything which shall derogate from their own authority and
importance”); see also A Plebeian, An Address to the People of the State of New York, Apr. 17,
1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 942, 944 (“The amendments
contended for as necessary to be made, are of such a nature, as will tend to limit and abridge a
number of the powers of the government. And is it probable, that those who enjoy these powers
will be so likely to surrender them after they have them in possession, as to consent to have
them restricted in the act of granting them? Common sense says—they will not.”).
28. E.g., 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2522 (Feb. 4, 1789) (reproducing
remarks of Samuel Rose, that Congress could propose amendments if it did not have sufficient
power and the states, acting through the convention, could propose if it had too much).
29. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 101 (“[Patrick Henry] thinks amendments can
never be obtained, because so great a number is required to concur. Had it rested solely with
Congress, there might have been danger. The committee will see that there is another mode
provided, besides that which originated with Congress. On the application of the legislatures of
two thirds of the several states, a convention is to be called to propose amendments. . . .”
(quoting George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention)); James Iredell, at the North
Carolina ratifying convention, also explained:
The proposition for amendments may arise from Congress itself, when two
thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary. If they should not, and yet
amendments be generally wished for by the people, two thirds of the
legislatures of the different states may require a general convention for the
purpose, in which case Congress are under the necessity of convening one. Any
amendments which either Congress shall propose, or which shall be proposed
by such general convention, are afterwards to be submitted to the legislatures of
the different states, or conventions called for that purpose, as Congress shall
think proper, and, upon the ratification of three fourths of the states, will
become a part of the Constitution.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177.
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must therefore be evident to every candid man, that two
thirds of the states can always procure a general convention
for the purpose of amending the constitution, and that three
fourths of them can introduce those amendments into the
constitution, although the President, Senate and Federal
House of Representatives, should be unanimously opposed
to each and all of them. Congress therefore cannot hold any
power, which three fourths of the states shall not approve,
on experience.30
II. OVERVIEW OF PRIOR AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH CONVENTIONS,
AND THEIR RECORDS AND TERMINOLOGY
A. Conventions Before the Constitution
The Founders understood a political “convention” to be an assembly,
other than a legislature, designed to undertake prescribed governmental
functions.31 The convention was a familiar and approved device: several
generations of Englishmen and Americans had resorted to them. In 1660
a “convention Parliament” had recalled the Stuart line, in the person of
Charles II, to the throne of England.32 A 1689 convention Parliament
had adopted the English Bill of Rights, declared the throne vacant, and
invited William and Mary to fill it.33 Also in 1689, Americans resorted
to at least four conventions in three different colonies as mechanisms to
replace unpopular colonial governments, and in 1719 they held yet
another.34
During the run-up to Independence, conventions within particular
colonies issued protests, operated as legislatures when the de jure
legislature had been dissolved, and removed British officials and
governed in their absence.35 After Independence, conventions wrote

30. Tench Coxe, A Friend of Society and Liberty, PA. GAZETTE, July 23, 1788, reprinted
in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 277, 283–84 (alteration added) (emphasis in
original). Coxe made the same points in A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention, PA.
GAZETTE, Jun. 11, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1139, l142.
Coxe had been Pennsylvania’s delegate to the Annapolis convention.
31. Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 6; see also In re Op. of the Justices, 167 A.
176, 179 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1933) (“The principal distinction between a convention and a
Legislature is that the former is called for a specific purpose, the latter for general purposes.”);
CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 5–6 (discussing the development of the word “convention” in the
seventeenth century).
32. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 5; see also Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 6.
33. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 5; Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 6.
34. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 6–7 (discussing two conventions in Massachusetts, one in
New York, one in Maryland, and one in South Carolina).
35. See id. at 8–10.
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several state constitutions.36
Those state constitutions also resorted to conventions as elements of
their amendment procedures. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776
and the Vermont Constitution of 1786 both authorized amendments
conventions limited as to subjects by a “council of censors.”37 The
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided for amendment by
convention.38 The Georgia Constitution of 1777 required the legislature
to call a convention to draft constitutional amendments whose gist had
been prescribed by a majority of counties.39
Conventions within individual colonies or states represented the
people, towns, or counties.40 Another sort of “convention” was a
36. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 10–13. Sometimes a joint session of the legislature met as a
convention to write a constitution, as happened with the unsuccessful Massachusetts constitution
of 1777. 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 315.
37. Pennsylvania’s original constitution provided, in relevant part:
The said council of censors shall also have power to call a convention, to meet
within two years after their sitting, if there appear to them an absolute necessity
of amending any article of the constitution which may be defective, explaining
such as may be thought not clearly expressed, and of adding such as are
necessary for the preservation of the rights and happiness of the people: But the
articles to be amended, and the amendments proposed, and such articles as are
proposed to be added or abolished, shall be promulgated at least six months
before the day appointed for the election of such convention, for the previous
consideration of the people, that they may have an opportunity of instructing
their delegates on the subject.
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47; see also VT. CONST. of 1786, art. XL (similar language).
38. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 stated that:
[T]he general court which shall be in the year of our Lord [1795] shall issue
precepts to the selectmen of the several towns, and to the assessors of the
unincorporated plantations, directing them to convene the qualified voters of
their respective towns and plantations, for the purpose of collecting their
sentiments on the necessity or expediency of revising the constitution in order
to [sic] amendments.
And if it shall appear, by the returns made, that two-thirds of the qualified
voters throughout the State, who shall assemble and vote in consequence of the
said precepts, are in favor of such revision or amendment, the general court
shall issue precepts, or direct them to be issued from the secretary’s office, to
the several towns to elect delegates to meet in convention for the purpose
aforesaid.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. VI, art. X.
39. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII.
40. HOAR, supra note 1, at 2–10 (describing state constitutional conventions at the
Founding); see also CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 8–16 (also discussing conventions). Thus, state
conventions for ratifying the Constitution represented the people. See, e.g., 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 110 (setting forth the Delaware form of ratification); id. at 275–78
(setting forth the Georgia form of ratification); id. at 560 (setting forth the Connecticut form of
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gathering of three or more American governments under protocols
modeled on international diplomatic practice.41 These multi-government
conventions were comprised of delegations from each participating
government, including, on some occasions, Indian tribes. Before
Independence, such gatherings often were called “congresses,” because
“congress” was an established term for a gathering of sovereignties.42
After Independence, they were more often called “conventions,”43
presumably to avoid confusion with the Continental and Confederation
Congresses. But both before44 and after45 Independence the terms could
be employed interchangeably.
Multi-government congresses or conventions were particularly
common in the Northeast, perhaps because governments in that region
had a history of working together. In 1643 the four colonies of
Massachusetts, Plymouth Colony, Connecticut, and New Haven formed
the United Colonies of New England. Essentially a joint standing
committee of colonial legislatures, this association was not always
active, but endured at least formally until 1684.46 In 1695, the Crown
created the Dominion of New England, a unified government imposed
on New England, New York, and New Jersey.47 The Dominion proved
ratification); cf. In re Op. of the Justices, 167 A. 176, 179 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1933) (noting that
conventions within states directly represented the people).
41. There also were many meetings of representatives of only two colonial
governments—for example, the 1684 and 1746 conferences with the Iroquois, and the 1785
meeting between Maryland and Virginia at Mount Vernon, but two-sovereign meetings seem
not to have been called “conventions.” IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 161, 182, 201. On
the pre-Independence conferences with the Iroquois, see generally id. at 157–208; see generally
FRANKLIN, INDIAN TREATIES, supra note 1.
42. See, e.g., THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1789) (defining “congress” in part as “an appointed meeting for settlement of affairs between
different nations”).
43. SeeParts III.D through III.O (discussing post-Independence multi-state conventions)..
44. See, e.g., 2 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 545 (reproducing Massachusetts
commission to Albany Congress, referring to it as “a General convention of Commissioners for
their Respective Governments”); 1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 17 (reproducing the
Connecticut credentials for the First Continental Congress, which empower Connecticut’s
delegates to attend the “congress, or convention of commissioners, or committees of the several
Colonies”); DANIEL LEONARD, MASSACHUSETTENSIS 106 (Boston, 1775) (referring to the Albany
Congress as a “congress or convention of committees from the several colonies”).
45. Rush, Notes, supra note 1, at 129 (Dec. 25, 1776) (referring to the Providence
Convention as “a Congress composed of Deputies from the 4 New Engd [sic] States”); Letter
from Daniel St. Thomas Jenifer to Thomas Sim Lee (Sept. 26, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note
1, at 391–92 (calling the 1780 Boston Convention a “Congress or Convention”); Gov. James
Bowdoin, Speech before Council Chamber (May 31, 1785), reprinted in 1784-85 MASS.
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 706, 710 (referring to a proposed general convention as a
“Convention or Congress” of “special delegates from the States”).
46. NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 24–25.
47. Id. at 1, at 26.
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unpopular, and in 1689 colonial conventions swept it away;
nevertheless, northeastern governments continued to confer together.
Many of these meetings were conclaves of colonial governors, usually
conferring on issues of defense against French Canada and her allied
Indian tribes, rather than conventions of diplomatic delegations.48 An
example from outside the Northeast was the meeting of five governors
held at Alexandria, Virginia in 1755.49 Many others, however, were
full-dress conventions among commissioners appointed from three or
more colonies. These meetings were usually, but not always, held under
the sanction of royal authorities.
To be specific: Three colonies met at Boston in 1689 to discuss
defense issues.50 The following year, the acting New York lieutenant
governor called, without royal sanction, a defense convention of most of
the continental colonies to meet in New York City. The meeting was
held on May 1, 1690, with New York, Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut,
and Plymouth colonies in attendance.51 A similar gathering occurred in
1693 in New York, this time under Crown auspices.52 Other defense
conventions were held in New York City in 1704,53 Boston in 1711,54
Albany in 1744 and 1745,55 and New York City in 1747.56 The New
England colonies held yet another in 1757.57
In addition to defense conventions, there were conventions serving
as diplomatic meetings among colonies and sovereign Indian tribes,
particularly the Iroquois. There were at least ten such conclaves
between 1677 and 1768 involving three or more colonies. Those ten
included gatherings in 1677, 1689, 1694, and 1722 at Albany, New
York; in 1744 at Lancaster, Pennsylvania; in 1745, 1746, 1751, and
1754 at Albany; and in 1768 at Fort Stanwix (Rome), New York.58
48. See generally, WARD, supra note 1, at 52–65 (summarizing war conferences and
conventions).
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id. at 52.
51. Id. at 52–53. The brief proceedings are in 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 134–35.
52. WARD, supra note 1, at 53–54.
53. Id. at 54.
54. Id. at 56.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 56–57.
57. Id. at 62.
58. IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY, supra note 1, at 160, 161, 173, 181 (listing two), 182, 185, 187,
190 & 197.WARD, supra note 1, adds the conventions held in 1689, 1694, and 1746. Id. at 131,
133 & 139. NEWBOLD, supra, note 1, at 28, seems to be counting Indian conferences at which
only one colony attended. He specifically names as multi-state gatherings only the 1744
Lancaster, Pennsylvania convention (Indians plus Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia); a
1748 (possibly an error for 1746) Albany meeting (Indians plus Massachusetts and New York);
and a 1751 gathering, also in Albany (Indians plus Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and
South Carolina). Id. Cf. SHANNON, supra, note 1, at 132 & 133 (adding the 1745 Albany
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The assembly at Lancaster became one of the more noted.
Participants included Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and several
Indian tribes. The proceedings lasted from June 22 to July 4, 1744, and
produced the Treaty of Lancaster.59 Even more important, however, was
the seven-colony Albany Congress of 1754, whose proceedings are
discussed in Part III.A.
The most famous inter-colonial conventions were the Stamp Act
Congress of 1765 and the First Continental Congress of 1774, discussed
in Parts IV.B and IV.C. As for the Second Continental Congress (177581), participants might initially have thought of it as a convention, but it
is not so classified here because it really served as a continuing
legislature.
After the colonies had declared themselves independent states, they
continued to gather in conventions. All of these meetings were called to
address specific issues of common concern. Northeastern states
convened twice in Providence, Rhode Island—in December, 1776 and
January, 1777, and again in 1781. Other conventions of northeastern
states met in Springfield, Massachusetts (1777); New Haven,
Connecticut (1778); Hartford, Connecticut (1779 and 1780); and
Boston, Massachusetts (1780).60 Conventions that included states
outside the Northeast included those at York Town, Pennsylvania
(1777), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1780 and, of course, 1787), and
Annapolis, Maryland (1786).61 There also were abortive calls for multistate conventions in Fredericksburg, Virginia, Charleston, South
Carolina, and elsewhere.62
Thus, the Constitutional Convention of 1787—far from being the
unique event it is often assumed to be—was but one in a long line of
similar gatherings.
B. Historical Records
Each convention produced official records referred to as its journal,
minutes, or proceedings. These records vary widely in length and
completeness. For example, the journals of the First Continental
Congress and of the Constitutional Convention consume hundreds of
pages, but the proceedings of the 1781 Providence Convention cover
conference between the Indians and Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York,
and stating accurately that four colonies attended the 1751 meeting in Albany).
59. WARD, supra note 1, at 137–38. Maryland and Virginia signed treaties with the
Indians at this conference, with Pennsylvania serving as a broker. The lieutenant governor of
Pennsylvania also served as a representative of the colony of Delaware. See FRANKLIN, INDIAN
TREATIES, supra note 1, at 41.
60. See Natelson, First Century, supra note 1, at 1–2.
61. See id.
62. Infra Part III.K–L.
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less than a page and a half. Fortunately, a fair amount of other historical
material supplements the journals. This material includes legislative
records, other official documents, and personal correspondence. The
journals and other sources tend to show consistency in convention
protocol and procedures.
The Albany Congress, the Stamp Act Congress, the First Continental
Congress, and the Constitutional Convention have been subjects of
detailed historical study. The other multi-state conventions have been
largely neglected.
C. Convention Terminology
Convention practice included certain standard terminology, some of
which appears in Article V. The convention call was the initial
invitation to meet. Most calls were issued by individual states or
colonies. Some were issued by the Continental Congress or by previous
conventions.
The usual role of a multi-state convention was as a problem-solving
task force, so the call necessarily specified the issue or issues to be
addressed. However, the call never attempted to dictate a particular
outcome or to limit the convention to answering a prescribed question
affirmatively or negatively. The call also specified the initial time and
place of meeting and whether the convention resolutions would bind the
participating states or serve merely as recommendations or proposals.
The call did not determine how the colonies or states were to select their
delegates, nor did it establish convention rules or choose convention
officers. An invited government was always free to ignore a call.
A general convention was one to which all or most colonies or states
were invited, even if limited to a single subject.63 A partial convention
was one restricted to a certain region, such as New England or the
Middle States. The terms “general” or “partial” referred only to
geographic area; they had nothing to do with the scope of the subject
matter specified by the call. Thus, a convention for proposing
amendments is a general convention, even if limited to a single
subject.64 Failure to understand why a convention for proposing
63. E.g., A Freeman, NEWPORT HERALD, Apr. 3, 1788, reprinted in 24 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 220–21 (referring to the Constitutional Convention as “the General
Convention of the States”). The Philadelphia Price Convention of 1780 was referred to as a
general convention because all but the three southernmost states were invited. PA. JOURNALS,
supra note 1, at 396–97 (Nov. 15, 1779).
64. E.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 177 (“The proposition for amendments
may arise from Congress itself, when two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary. If they
should not, and yet amendments be generally wished for by the people, two thirds of the
legislatures of the different states may require a general convention for the purpose, in which
case Congress are under the necessity of convening one. Any amendments which either
Congress shall propose, or which shall be proposed by such general convention, are afterwards
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amendments is referred to as a general convention has led some writers
to conclude that it must be unlimited as to topic.65
A plenipotentiary convention was one whose topic was unlimited.
The credentials issued to delegates to the First Continental Congress
were so broad, that it was arguably plenipotentiary.66 The powers of the
other multi-government conventions ranged from the very broad (the
Springfield Convention of 1777,67 the 1787 Constitutional
Convention)68 to the very narrow (e.g., the Providence Convention of
1781).69
A committee was a colonial or state delegation—that is, the body
into which the diplomacy of the colony or state had been committed.
Thus, an interstate convention, while often referred to by a variant of
the phrase “convention of the states,”70 also could be called a
“convention of committees”71 or a “convention of committees of the
several states.”72
Each participating colony or state empowered its representatives by
documents called commissions, sometimes referred to also as
credentials.73 Although a representative could be referred to informally
as a “delegate,” the formal title was commissioner.74 Each commission

to be submitted to the legislatures of the different states, or conventions called for that purpose,
as Congress shall think proper, and, upon the ratification of three fourths of the states, will
become a part of the Constitution.” (quoting James Iredell, at the North Carolina ratifying
convention)) Iredell, a leading lawyer and judge, later served as associate justice on the United
States Supreme Court.
65. E.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82
YALE L.J. 189, 202 (1972).
66. Infra Part III.C.
67. Infra Part III.F.
68. On the broad scope of the powers of most delegates at the Constitutional Convention,
see infra Part III.N–O.
69. Infra Part III.L.
70. E.g., A Freeman, NEWPORT HERALD, Apr. 3, 1788, reprinted in 24 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 220; 19 J. CONT. CONG. 235 (Mar. 6, 1781) (referring to the second
Hartford convention as a “convention of sundry states”).
71. E.g., 11 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 843 (Aug. 27, 1778) (referring to the
Springfield gathering); 15 id. at 1254 (Nov. 10, 1779) (referring to the first Hartford convention
the same way); id. at 1272 (Nov. 15, 1779) (same); 17 id. at 790 (Aug. 29, 1780) (referring to
the 1780 Boston Convention); 18 id. at 931–32 (Oct. 16, 1780) (same); id. at 1141 (Dec. 12,
1780) (referring to the second Hartford convention the same way).
72. E.g., 9 id. at 1043 (Dec. 20, 1777) (referring to the prospective New Haven
convention).
73. See generally infra Part III (discussing proceedings at various conventions).
74. Hence, such a convention sometimes was called a “convention of commissioners.”
See, e.g., 15 id. at 1287 (Nov. 18, 1779) (so labeling the first Hartford convention); PA.
JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 398 (Nov. 18, 1779) (also so labeling the first Hartford Convention).
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specified the topic of the meeting and the scope of authority granted.75
Instructions might supplement the commission.76 Unlike commissions,
instructions were not usually reproduced in the convention journal, and
might be secret.77 A delegate’s commission or instructions could restrict
his authority to a scope narrower than the scope of the call. For
example, the commissions issued by New York, Massachusetts, and
Delaware to their delegates to the Constitutional Convention limited
their authority to a scope narrower than the call.78
Like other agents, commissioners were expected to remain within
the limits of their authority, and ultra vires acts were not legally
binding.79 However, also like other agents, commissioners could make
non-binding recommendations to their principals. To put this in modern
terms: A convention for proposing amendments could recommend that
Congress or the states consider amendments outside the subject-matter
assigned to the convention, but those recommendations would be
legally void—that is, they would not be ratifiable “proposals.”
Each state determined how to appoint its commissioners, but in
practice the legislature usually selected them, with chambers in
bicameral legislatures acting either by joint vote or seriatim.80 If the
legislature was not in session or had authorized the executive to fill
vacancies, then selection was by the executive—normally the governor
and his executive council, but in wartime often by the state’s committee
of safety.81 Each colony or state paid its own delegates.82
75. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 1, at 199 (James Madison) (“The powers of
the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given
to the members by their respective constituents.”).
76. E.g., 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574 (reproducing Rhode Island’s instructions
to its delegates at the 1780 Philadelphia Price Convention); 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at
307–08 (reproducing instructions to delegates at the 1780 Philadelphia Price Convention);
1786–1787 id. at 320 (reproducing instructions to delegates to the Annapolis Convention); id. at
447–49 (reproducing instructions to delegates to the Constitutional Convention).
77. As the Massachusetts instructions set forth supra note 76 undoubtedly were, since
they quarreled with the purposes of the convention.
78. See infra notes 411 & 415 and accompanying text.
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (“There is no
position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority,
contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.”); see THOMAS
BRADBURY CHANDLER, WHAT THINK YE OF THE CONGRESS NOW? 7 (New York, J. Rivington
1775) (stating that a principal is bound by an agent’s actions within the scope of the
commission, but not by actions that exceed the scope of the commission). For a summary of
eighteenth-century fiduciary law, see generally Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special
Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 239, 251–69 (2007).
80. See, e.g., Part III.F (discussing selection of delegates to the 1777 Springfield
convention).
81. See generally Part III; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (“[I]f Vacancies happen by
Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive
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As observed earlier, the official proceedings of the convention,
drafted by the convention secretary or clerk, constituted its journal,
minutes, or proceedings.
III. SUMMARY OF CONVENTIONS PRIOR TO THE CONSTITUTION
This Part III summarizes the central procedures and characteristics
of the three inter-colonial conventions for which records are most
complete and all of the interstate conventions for which I have found
records. This is not intended to be an exhaustive history of these
meetings. It focuses principally on the protocols and usages employed
in calling, conducting, and considering the recommendations of intergovernmental conventions.
A. The Albany Congress of 1754
Of the multi-colonial conventions in Albany during the eighteenth
century, the gathering between June 19 and July 11, 1754 is by far the
best documented. It also has been the subject of several scholarly
studies.83
Twenty-five delegates from seven colonies participated in the 1754
Albany Congress. The number of colonies actually was eight if one
counts Delaware, which had its own legislature but an executive held in
common with Pennsylvania. Georgia had not been invited; the other
thereof may make temporary Appointments. . . .”); id. art. IV, § 4 (“[May protect the states from
domestic violence] on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened). . . .”) For the roles of committees of safety (also called “councils of war”
and “councils of safety”) during “the recess” of Founding-Era state legislatures, see Robert G.
Natleson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies that May Happen During the Recess” in the
Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, 37 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming,
2014).
82. E.g., 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 270–71 (showing payment of delegates to the
two Hartford Conventions); 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 175 (showing payment to
commissioners to first Hartford Convention); id. at 233 (showing payment to New Haven
commissioners); id. at 296 (showing payment to commissioners to first Hartford Convention);
id. at 308 (payment for Philadelphia Price Convention); id. at 387 (same); 1786–1787 id. at 304
(showing allowance to commissioners to Annapolis Convention); id. at 519 (showing allowance
to commissioners to Constitutional Convention); 15 PA. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 135 (Minutes
of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, showing payment to Tench Coxe for service
in Annapolis); id. at 546 (showing payment to widow of William Henry for service at the
Philadelphia Price Convention); 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 301 (showing payments to
delegates to the first Providence and Springfield Conventions); id. at 369 (showing payment to
New Haven commissioner); 9 id. at 293 (showing payment to commissioner to first Hartford
Convention).
83. See generally, e.g., NEWBOLD, supra note 1; SHANNON, supra note 1; see also Beverly
McAnear, Notes and Documents, Personal Accounts of the Albany Congress of 1754, 39 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 727 (1953); John R. Alden, The Albany Congress and the Creation of the
Indian Superintendencies, 27 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 193 (1940). The minutes of the Albany
Congress appear in 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 853–92.
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colonies had been invited but did not attend. Appendixes A and B list
the commissioners and the colonies they represented for the Albany
Congress and for the other (non-abortive) conventions discussed in this
Article.
In a few ways the Albany Congress varied from most subsequent
multi-government gatherings. Because it was called primarily to
conduct diplomacy with the Six Nations of the Iroquois, it included
delegates from the Six Nations as well as commissioners from the
colonies.84 Although the immediate call came from James DeLancey,
the royal lieutenant governor of New York,85 DeLancey was acting as a
proxy for the British Lords of Trade.86 Thus, the Albany Congress was
different from future conventions in that the British government was
represented. Moreover, as the representative of the Crown,87 DeLancey
was expected to preside; beginning in 1774, multi-colonial and multistate conventions invariably elected their own presiding officers.
Otherwise, the practices followed before and during the Albany
Congress were consistent with those of later gatherings.
First, like the call of most subsequent conventions, the call for the
Albany Congress was limited rather than plenipotentiary.88 The
specified topic was improving relations with the Iroquois and signing an
inter-colonial treaty with them.89
Second, each participating colony sent “commissioners” empowered
by “commissions” or “credentials.” An exception was New York, where
the lieutenant governor and members of the executive council
comprised that state’s committee. Those delegates needed no
commissions because their offices granted them sufficient authority.90
Third, the colonies themselves decided how to select their delegates.
New York, as noted, sent its executive council. In Pennsylvania the
lieutenant governor chose the commissioners with the consent of the
colony’s proprietors.91 In Maryland, the governor made the selection.92
In the other four colonies, the legislature elected the commissioners.93
84. See 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 866.
85. DeLancy undertook the task because the royal governor, Sir Danvers Osborne, had
committed suicide. NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 23.
86. The Lords of Trade letter appears at N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 854–56.
87. SHANNON, supra note 1, at 130 (“James DeLancey ironically became the king’s
mouthpiece at the Albany Congress.”).
88. See NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 47–48.
89. 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 856 (quoting letter from Lords of Trade to New
York governor).
90. SHANNON, supra note 1, at 147.
91. 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 549–50.
92. Id. at 551.
93. The Massachusetts commission recites selection by the General Court (legislature). 2
N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 545. The New Hampshire commission is not entirely clear, but
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In subsequent conventions, the legislative election method became
dominant.
Fourth, each colony decided how many delegates to send. New
Hampshire credentialed four commissioners, Massachusetts five, Rhode
Island two, Connecticut three, New York five, Pennsylvania four, and
Maryland two.94 By far the best-known today of the delegates was
Benjamin Franklin, although two others are well known to students of
the period: Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts was to become the
royal governor of his colony and perhaps the continent’s most
prominent Tory. Rhode Island’s Stephen Hopkins would become a
leading Founder and signer of the Declaration of Independence.95
Fifth, despite the different size of colonial committees, the weight of
each colony seems to have been equal. The Albany Congress
established a precedent followed by all subsequent conventions: “to
avoid all disputes about the precedency of the Colonies,” they always
were ordered in the minutes from north to south.96
Sixth, the Albany Congress kept an official record of its proceedings,
which it denominated the minutes.97
Seventh, the gathering elected a non-delegate, Peter Wraxall, as
secretary (in later conventions sometimes entitled “clerk”), and he was
put on oath.98
Finally, the group established its own committees, and elected
members to staff them.99
Most of the time at the Albany Congress was consumed by
negotiations with the Iroquois. At the urging of Franklin, however, the
gathering also recommended to the colonies and to Parliament a “Plan
of Union” uniting most of British North America under a single Grand
Council and President-General. The vote for the Plan at the Albany
Congress was unanimous, but the scheme became highly controversial.
Many saw the it as beyond the scope of the Congress’s call, even
though the language of most of the commissions was broad enough to
authorize the recommendation.100 Some colonies refused to consider it,
implies selection of two delegates from each legislative chamber. Id. at 546–47. The
Connecticut credentials recite selection by the general assembly, id. at 547–48, as do those of
Rhode Island, id. at 548–49.
94. See Newbold, supra note 1, at 45.
95. See id. at 42–43.
96. 6 N.Y. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 859.
97. Id. at 853–59.
98. Id. at 859.
99. Id. at 860.
100. The Commissions are located at 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 545–53, at 47.
Newbold claims that only the Massachusetts commissioners had such authority, but he reads the
other commissions far too narrowly. NEWBOLD, supra note 1, at 47. Historian Timothy J.
Shannon, SHANNON, supra note 1, at 176, is more accurate, but is incorrect when he states that
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and those that did consider it, rejected it.101 This reception assured that
the Plan was never introduced in Parliament.102
B. The Stamp Act Congress of 1765
The Stamp Act Congress was held at the instigation of the colonists;
it was not sponsored by the Crown. The gathering is fairly well
documented, largely due to C.A. Weslager’s diligent research, and his
1976 book based on that research.103
This convention (as in other cases, the word was used
interchangeably with “congress”)104 was called by the lower house of
the Massachusetts legislature “to Consult togather [sic] on the present
Circumstances of the Colonies and the Difficulties to which they are
and must be reduced by the operation of the late Acts of Parliment
[sic],” particularly the Stamp Act.105 The call was, therefore, quite broad
but not plenipotentiary. It asked that the invited colonies send “such
Committees as the other Houses of Representatives, or Burgesses in the
Several Colonies on this Continent may think fit to Appoint. . . ”106 The
call specified the date of meeting (October 1, 1765) and the place (New
York City). The invitation was not extended to the British colonies in
Canada or in the Caribbean.
Nine of the 13 invited colonies sent committees: New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina. The number of
commissioners on each committee ranged from two to five. There were
27 in all. Despite the call’s suggestion that the lower house of each
colony elect commissioners, the colonies used their judgment in the
matter. Several colonies whose legislatures had been prorogued or
dissolved chose delegates by other means. In New York, the legislature
Maryland commissioners were forbidden to discuss a union: they were barred merely from
committing to one. 2 N.Y. HISTORY, supra note 1, at 552. The Plan of Union was a
recommendation only. In his subsequent pamphlet advocating the plan, Rhode Island
commissioner Stephen Hopkins defensively included language from the credentials of four
colonies that seemed to authorize the Plan, but omitted the Pennsylvania credentials, which were
more restrictive. STEPHEN HOPKINS, A TRUE REPRESENTATION OF THE PLAN FORMED AT ALBANY,
FOR UNITING ALL THE BRITISH NORTHERN COLONIES, IN ORDER TO THEIR COMMON SAFETY AND
DEFENSE 1–3 (Newport, 1755).
101. NEWBOLD, supra, note 1, at 169–70.
102. Id. at 173.
103. WESLAGER, supra note 1.
104. On the interchangeability of the two terms to describe meetings of governments, see
supra notes 44 and 45 and accompanying text. Thus, the word “convention” frequently was
applied to the Stamp Act Congress. See, e.g., WESLAGER, supra note 1, at 62 (referring to the
meeting as a convention) & id. at 89 (quoting Thomas Whately as referring to it as a
convention); 116 (citing attack on the meeting as an “illegal convention”).
105. The call is reproduced id. at 181–82.
106. Id.
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previously had designed five New York City lawmakers as a committee
of correspondence; after informal consultation with their colleagues,
that committee decided to act as the delegation.107 In Delaware, out-ofsession lawmakers chose the commissioners.108 The convention seated
delegates even if their selection was not in accord with the mode
suggested by the call.
The commissioners included Oliver Partridge of Massachusetts, who
had served at the 1754 gathering in Albany, and a number of other
members destined to become “old convention hands.”109 Eliphat Dyer
of Connecticut, for example, served in four subsequent Founding Era
conventions.110 The roster also included three men who performed
distinguished service at the 1787 Constitutional Convention: John
Dickinson of Pennsylvania (who represented Delaware in Philadelphia),
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, and John Rutledge of South
Carolina.111 The gathering was late getting started, but finally convened
on October 7.
The protocols and procedures followed in organizing and operating
the Stamp Act Congress foreshadowed those of all subsequent
gatherings of the type. As we have seen, the call was a sparse document,
limited to date, place and subject. Although unlike most subsequent
convention calls, it suggested how delegates might be appointed, the
colonies did not find this suggestion binding and the convention seated
each colony’s delegates however selected.112 Each colony paid its own
committee,113 and issued credentials and instructions.114 Some of these
authorized their delegates only to consult,115 while the rest empowered
them to join in any proposed course of action.
The convention adopted its own rules and chose its own
committees.116 It selected a commissioner, Timothy Ruggles of
Massachusetts, as President,117 and a non-commissioner, John Cotton,
as Secretary.118 It elected those two gentlemen by ballot, but then
107. Id. at 80–81.
108. Id. at 93–95. Such was also the case in South Carolina, id. at 148.
109. For a list of all commissioners, see id. at 255.
110. See Appendix A.
111. Id.; WESLAGER, supra note 1, at 255.
112. WESLAGER, supra note 1, at 198 (reproducing portion of journal reporting seating of
irregularly-selected delegates).
113. See, e.g., id. at 62 (Massachusetts), 69 (Connecticut), 73 (Maryland), 85
(Pennsylvania).
114. The credentials are reproduced id. at 183–97; for an example of instructions, see id. at
88 (Rhode Island).
115. These included Connecticut, id. at 69 and South Carolina. Id. at 148.
116. Id. at 124 (discussing election of committee to inspect minutes and proceedings).
117. Id. at 122.
118. Id. at 123.
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reverted to the rule of one colony/one vote.119 It also kept a journal.120
The convention adjourned on October 25 after issuing four documents:
A declaration of the rights of the colonists, an address to the king, a
memorial to the House of Lords, and a petition to the House of
Commons.121
C. The Continental Congress of 1774
The call for a continental congress or convention came from the
New York Committee of Correspondence in a circular letter authored
by John Jay.122 The gathering was a general rather than a partial
convention, since all the colonies were invited.123
The Congress met in Philadelphia on September 5, 1774 and
adjourned on October 26 of the same year. Fifty-six commissioners
from twelve of the thirteen continental colonies south of Canada
attended; Georgia was absent. (See Appendices A and B.) The journal
of the proceedings is extensive, and of course the history of the
Congress has inspired a massive amount of retelling. The task here is
not to recite that history, but to identify key protocols and procedures.
In most colonies, commissioners were chosen by the de facto
legislative authority. In Rhode Island, the de jure legislature also
governed de facto, so it named that colony’s commissioners. In other
colonies, royal officials and upper-house councilors had become
recalcitrant, so commissioners were selected either by the lower house
(as in Massachusetts or Pennsylvania) or by colonial conventions acting
as legislatures (New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North
Carolina). In Connecticut, the lower house empowered the committee of
correspondence to appoint the commissioners. In New York, voters
elected them directly in local meetings.124
In its scope, the First Continental Congress was perhaps the most
nearly plenipotentiary of multi-colonial and multi-state conventions.
Colony-issued credentials granted very broad authority to consult and
recommend solutions to the crisis with Great Britain. The narrowest
credentials, those issued by Rhode Island, empowered that colony’s
119. Id. at 124–25 (discussing the one colony/one vote decision).
120. The journal is reproduced id. at 181–218.
121. These documents are reproduced in the journal.
122. The text of the letter is reproduced at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/letter_
ny_comm_1774.asp (last accessed Mar. 12, 2013). For an account, see Edward D. Collins,
Committees of Correspondence of the American Revolution 262 (1901).
123. The New York invitation stated that the gathering should be a “congress of deputies
from the colonies in general. . .” See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/letter_ny_comm_
1774.asp (last accessed Mar. 12, 2013).
124. The credentials of delegates from attending states other than North Carolina are
reproduced at 1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 15–24. Those for North Carolina are
reproduced at id. at 30.
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delegates
to meet and join with the commissioners or delegates from
the other colonies, in consulting upon proper measures to
obtain a repeal of the several acts of the British parliament,
for levying taxes upon his Majesty’s subjects in America,
without their consent, and particularly an act lately passed
for blocking up the port of Boston, and upon proper
measures to establish the rights and liberties of the
Colonies, upon a just and solid foundation, agreeable to the
instructions given you by the general Assembly.125
The other credentials were wider still, for they not only authorized
almost unlimited discussion, but also conveyed authority to bind their
respective colonies to collective decisions. For example, the Delaware
commissions empowered delegates “to consult and advise [i.e.,
deliberate] with the deputies from the other colonies, and to determine
upon all such prudent and lawful measures, as may be judged most
expedient for the Colonies immediately and unitedly to adopt. . . .”126
Pennsylvania bestowed authority “to form and adopt a plan for the
purposes of obtaining redress of American grievances,”127 and New
Jersey used the general formula, “to represent the Colony of New Jersey
in the said general congress.”128 Thus, Rhode Island had in mind a
proposing convention, but the other colonies sought one that actually
could decide matters. When a commissioner had authority to bind his
government, international lawyers said he had power to pledge the faith
of his government.129 Variants on “pledge the faith” appear in the
proceedings of several later multi-state conventions.130
Ultimately, however, the First Continental Congress made no
decisions legally binding on the colonies. It merely issued a series of
recommendations and petitions, memorials and other communications.
Thus, it remained within the scope of power authorized by the
narrowest credentials.
As the Stamp Act Congress had done,131 the First Continental
Congress elected all its own officers and staffed all its own committees.
125. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. Cf. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 2, §§ 163, 220, 329.4 (Liberty Fund
ed., 2008) (1758) (discussing the faith of treaties); id. bk. 2, § 225 (discussing the pledge of faith
in an oath); id. bk. 2, § 234 (discussing tacit pledges of faith), bk. 3, § 238 (discussing the
pledge of faith in truces and suspensions of arms).
130. This is most notable in the commissions issued for the Philadelphia Price Convention.
Infra notes 261–63 and accompanying text.
131. Supra Part III.B.
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At the first session, the gathering elected Peyton Randolph, a delegate
from Virginia, as president, and Charles Thompson, a non-delegate, as
secretary.132 The following day, the convention set about adopting rules.
The first of these was the principle of suffrage:
Resolved, That in determining questions in this
Congress, each Colony or Province shall have one Vote.—
The Congress not being possess’d of, or at present able to
procure proper materials for ascertaining the importance of
each Colony.133 [The session then adopted the following
additional rules.]
Resolved, That no person shall speak more than twice on
the same point, without the leave of the Congress.
Resolved, That no question shall be determined the day,
on which it is agitated and debated, if any one of the
Colonies desire the determination to be postponed to
another day.
Resolved, That the doors be kept shut during the time of
business, and that the members consider themselves under
the strongest obligations of honour, to keep the proceedings
secret, untill [sic] the majority shall direct them to be made
public.
Resolved, unan: That a Committee be appointed to State
the rights of the Colonies in general, the several instances
in which these rights are violated or infringed, and the
means most proper to be pursued for obtaining a restoration
of them. . . .
Resolved, That the Rev.d Mr. Duché be desired to open
the Congress tomorrow morning with prayers, at the
Carpenter’s Hall, at 9 o’Clock.134
These rules were adopted by the Second Continental Congress as
well.135
Before adjournment, the Congress issued a conditional call for a
second congress to meet on May 10, 1775, “unless the redress of
grievances, which we have desired, be obtained before that time.”136
The body then dissolved itself.137

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 14.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
2 id. at 55.
1 id. at 102.
Id. at 114.
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D. The Providence Convention of 1776–1777
The first multi-government convention after Independence was that
held from December 25, 1776 to January 2, 1777 in Providence, Rhode
Island.
On November 16, 1776, the Massachusetts House of Representatives
passed, and the council approved, a resolution that served both as the
call and as the appointment of delegates. It specified as subjects paper
currency and public credit. The convention was to confer on those
subjects and make proposals to the legislatures sending them, as well as
to Congress.138 The power of the Massachusetts delegation to
communicate proposals to other states and to Congress was conditional
on agreement by the committees of the other states. The resolution
appointed Tristram Dalton and Azor Orne as “a Committee to meet
Committees from the General Assemblies of the States of Connecticut,
New-Hampshire and Rhode-Island, at Providence in Rhode-Island the
tenth day of December next. . . .”139
On November 21, the Rhode Island general assembly accepted the
call and appointed its own committee.140 Just four days later,
Connecticut rejected the call. In a letter to Massachusetts Council
president James Bowdoin, Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull
explained that “[I] am desired by the Assembly of this State to advise”
that such a convention might “give umbrage to the other States” because
Congress previously had “taken the subject into consideration.”
Trumbull added that Connecticut already had laws dealing with
138. The Massachusetts resolution stated:
Resolved, That the Honourable Tristram Dalton and Aaron Orne, Esquires,
with such as the honourable Board shall join, be a Committee to meet
Committees from the General Assemblies of the States of Connecticut, NewHampshire, and Rhode-Island, at Providence, in Rhode-Island, the tenth day of
December next, provided said Assemblies think proper to appoint such
Committees, then and there to hold a conference respecting further emissions of
Paper Currency on the credit of any of said States; also on measures necessary
for supporting the credit of the publick [sic] Currencies thereof: And the said
Committee (if the Committees of the other States so met agree thereto) be
empowered to communicate to the other United States of America the intention
of their Convention, and urge that some measures be taken by them to the same
purpose, and to give like information to the honourable the Continental
Congress, and propose to them whether the regulation of the Currencies is not
an object of necessary attention, and to report as soon as may be.
And it is Ordered, That the Secretary immediately transmit authenticated
copies of the Resolve to the General Assemblies of the several States
aforementioned.
3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 772.
139. 19 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 661.
140. 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 48–49.
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currency and credit issues.141
Initially, the Massachusetts Council voted to proceed with the
convention “the foregoing letter notwithstanding,”142 but the House was
opposed. With the ultimate concurrence of the Council, the legislature
wrote to New Hampshire and Rhode Island informing them the
gathering was canceled.143 President Bowdoin expressed the belief,
however, that “this matter will be taken up again.”144
Bowdoin turned out to be right. On December 6 (the same day the
Massachusetts legislature decided not to pursue the convention) Rhode
Island’s Governor Nicholas Cooke, surveying the military situation,
wrote to Bowden that Rhode Island would “readily concur in proper
measures with the Assemblies of the States of Massachusetts-Bay and
Connecticut.”145 Just three days after that, Trumbell sent a missive to
Massachusetts bemoaning the sad state of the American cause. He
added:
When we had an intimation from you a few weeks past
for Commissioners from the New-England States to meet at
Providence, to confer on the affair of our currency, it was
then thought, for prudential reasons given you in answer
then, to decline; but I beg leave to suggest whether, in the
present aspect of affairs, our main army drove to the
southward, the communication being greatly interrupted
and in danger of being totally obstructed between the
Southern and New-England Colonies, whether it will not be
best, as soon as the enemy are retired into winter quarters,
for the New-England States to meet by their
Commissioners to consult on the great affairs of our safety,
and of counteracting the enemy in their future
operations. . . . We hope we shall soon hear from you on
this subject.146
With the Massachusetts House then in recess, the Council, through
Bowdoin, responded warmly. Bowdoin assured Trumbull that
141. Letter from Jonathan Trumbull to James Bowdoin (Nov. 25, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 845. Trumbull further explained the decision in a letter to Governor
Cooke of Rhode Island. Letter from Governor Trumbull to Governour Cooke (Dec. 4, 1776), in
3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1077.
142. 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 845–46 (Dec. 6, 1776).
143. Id. at 846.
144. James Bowdoin to President Weare (President of the Council of New Hampshire),
Dec. 6, 1776, reprinted in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1104–05.
145. Letter from Governor Cooke to James Bowdoin (Dec. 6, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1104.
146. Letter from Governor Trumbull to Mass. Council (Dec. 9, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1142–43.
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Massachusetts was still willing to participate, and that the authority of
the Bay State delegates would be expanded to include military affairs:
The regulation of the price of things, (the mode you have
adopted,) was thought of, and might have been the best, but
many objections arose, which at that time prevented it.
However, as we have renewed our application to you to
join with the other States of New-England in the appointing
a Committee to consider this and other matters, we hope
you will approve the measure, and that great good will
result from it. By our proposal their commission is to be so
extensive as to include the important business you mention
of consulting on the great affairs of our safety, and
counteracting the enemy in their future operations. But if
this is not expressed in terms sufficiently explicit, you can
agree to our proposal with such additions as you think
proper, and there is no doubt we shall concur with you.147
After that communication, all the invited states acted quickly. On
December 18, for example, Massachusetts delegate Tristram Dalton
acknowledged receiving his orders,148 and on the same day the
Connecticut legislature appointed its delegates and defined their
authority.149 The committees had gathered in Providence by Christmas
Day.
Thirteen delegates represented the four states: four from Connecticut
and three each from Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts
(which had added Thomas Cushing to its committee).150 All had been
appointed by their respective legislatures, except for the Rhode Island
commissioners. The British had occupied much of that state, so the
legislature had deputized a council of war to exercise its powers. The
council of war appointed its commissioners, two of whom were
members of the council itself.151
The states had granted their delegates authority that, while not
unlimited, was quite broad. As promised, Massachusetts had expanded
the power conferred on its committee to include military as well as
147. Letter from Massachusetts Council to Governor Trumbull (Dec. 13, 1776), in 3
AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1209–10.
148. Letter from Tristram Dalton to John Avery (Dec. 18, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1287.
149. 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 1389.
150. For the delegates, see Appendices A and B. One delegate, a man from New
Hampshire, rejoiced in the name of Supply Clap. Apparently he was a competent fellow. See
Letter from John Langdon to Josiah Bartlett (June 3, 1776), in BARTLETT PAPERS, supra note 1,
at 67, 68 n.2.
151. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585, 588.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

28

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

643

economic measures, with the proviso that they avoid subjects
“repugnant to or interfering with the powers and authorities of the
Continental Congress.”152 Connecticut granted authority to address
public credit and “every measure . . . necessary for the common
defense.”153 The authority of the Rhode Island committee was
similar.154 Only New Hampshire issued narrower credentials, which
encompassed military matters but did not mention currency or public
credit.155
However, a key reason for the decision to address currency and
public credit was the need to keep armies in the field. Accordingly, the
New Hampshire delegates finally concluded that commissions were
broad enough to include them. As Josiah Bartlett, one of those delegates
explained:
I am fully sensible of the difficulties attending the setting
prices to any thing, much more to every thing, but unless
something was done so as the soldier might be ascertained
of what he could purchase for his forty shillings, no more
would enlist, nor could we with reason expect it: what will
be the effect of establishing prices I know not, however it
must be tried . . . .156
The call had been for a convention that would make proposals only,
without authority to “pledge the faith” of the participating governments.
This limitation, reflected in a letter from the Rhode Island’s Stephen
Hopkins, the first president of the convention, to the Massachusetts
council,157 also appeared in the credentials and in the proceedings: The
latter repeatedly referred to convention resolutions as “representations”
or “applications” (in a precatory sense).158
The convention elected its own officers, initially choosing Hopkins
as president.159 When Hopkins left midway through the proceedings, the
convention replaced him with William Bradford, also from Rhode

152. Id. at 585, 586.
153. Id. at 587.
154. Id. at 588.
155. Id. at 587.
156. Letter from Josiah Bartlett to William Whipple (Jan. 15, 1777), in BARTLETT PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 143–44; see also 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585, 592 (a convention
resolution expressing the view that “exhorbitant [sic] price[s] of every necessary and convention
article of life . . . disheartens and disaffects the soldiers.”).
157. Letter from Stephen Hopkins to James Bowdoin, 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note
1, at 1423 (stating in part, “we . . . are of opinion” and “We submit this representation, and
desire you would give orders”).
158. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585, 589.
159. Id. at 589.
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Island.160 As clerk, the delegates selected Rowse J. Helme, a nondelegate.161
The Providence Convention of 1776–1777 issued a wide range of
recommendations, covering prices, auctions, and an embargo of luxury
goods.162 Its final proposal—a “Day of Fasting, Public Humiliation, and
Prayer”163—would in those religious times and in religious New
England certainly, be seen as within the delegates’ respective powers.
On January 2, 1777, the group adjourned sine die.164 The convention’s
recommendations were taken seriously, and later in the year,
Massachusetts and Connecticut both sent troops to Rhode Island in
accordance with them.165
E. The York Town and Abortive Charleston Price Conventions of 1777
When the Continental Congress received letters from Connecticut
and Massachusetts describing the Providence recommendations,
Congress scheduled the matter for discussion.166 That discussion spread
over several days in late January and the first half of February, 1777.167
Some congressional delegates questioned whether the meeting of the
New England states had been proper, in view of the power vested in
Congress. Those delegates were in the minority, however;
contemporaneous reports relate that Congress in general was quite
pleased with the recommendations, particularly those pertaining to
prices.168
160. Id. at 592.
161. Id. at 589.
162. See id. at 589–99. For the embargo recommendation, see id. at 597.
163. Id. at 598–99.
164. Id. at 589.
165. Id. at 161; 19 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 732–33.
166. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 65–66 (referring to receipt of the letters and
scheduling of discussion on Jan. 28, 1777).
167. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 79, 80–81 (Jan. 31, 1777); id. at 85, 87–88 (Feb. 4,
1777); id. at 88, 93–94 (Feb. 5, 1777); id. at 94, 97 (Feb. 6, 1777); id. at 108, 111–12 (Feb. 12,
1777); id. at 112, 118 (Feb. 13, 1777); id. at 118, 121–22 (Feb. 14, 1777); id. at 123, 124–25
(Feb. 15, 1777).
168. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 88 (committee of the whole report, Feb. 4, 1777);
id. at 118, 121–22 n.4 (Feb. 14, 1777); id. at 123, 124–25 (Feb. 15, 1777); see also Letter of the
Massachusetts Delegates to the President of the Massachusetts Council (Jan. 31, 1777), 196
MASSACHUSETTS ARCHIVES 183, reprinted in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 228–29 (“[A] similar
Mode for giving Stability to the Currency will probably be recommended to the Southern and
middle Departments of the Continent.”); Letter from Samuel Adams to James Warren (Feb. 1,
1777), in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 233 (stating that the Providence resolutions “are much
applauded as being wise and salutary”); Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Feb. 7,
1777), reprinted in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 237 (“The attempt of New England to regulate
prices is extremely popular in Congress, who will recommend an imitation of it to the other
States.”); Letter from Abraham Clark to the Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly (Feb. 8,
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On February 15, Congress formally approved the military and
economic recommendations of the Providence Convention, “except that
part which recommends the striking bills bearing interest.”169 Congress
resolved further:
That the plan for regulating the price of labour, of
manufactures and of internal produce within those states,
and of goods imported from foreign parts, except military
stores, be referred to the consideration of the other [U]nited
States: and that it be recommended to them, to adopt such
measures, as they shall think most expedient to remedy the
evils occasioned by the present fluctuating and exorbitant
prices of the articles aforesaid[.]170
Congress then proceeded to call two additional conventions, both of
the “proposing” or recommendatory kind:
That, for this purpose, it be recommended to the
legislatures, or, in their recess, to the executive powers of
the States of New York, New Jersey, Pensylvania [sic],
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, to appoint
commissioners to meet at York town, in Pensylvania, on
the 3d Monday in March next, to consider of, and form a
system of regulation adapted to those States, to be laid
before the respective legislatures of each State, for their
approbation:
That, for the like purpose, it be recommended to the
legislatures, or executive powers in the recess of the
legislatures of the States of North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia, to appoint commissioners to meet at
Charlestown [sic], in South Carolina, on the first Monday
in May next[.]171
The Charleston convention apparently was never held.172 One likely
reason was the objection by North Carolina that Virginia, the economic
powerhouse of the region, had been grouped with the middle rather than

1777), in 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 242 (reporting that congressional approbation is expected);
Rush, Notes, supra note 1, at 131–39.
169. 7 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 124 (Feb. 15, 1777).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 124–25 (Feb. 15, 1777).
172. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 17. South Carolina legislative records from the time are lost,
and Georgia records are spotty, but my investigation and those of two experienced state
archivists makes this conclusion probable.
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the southern states.173 However, eighteen commissioners from New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia had
convened in York Town by March 26.174 The committees from each
state ranged in size from two commissioners to five.175 The convention
minutes do not reproduce their credentials. I have been able to find only
the authority of the Virginia delegates, which was much the same as
called for by Congress. After reciting the fact of the call, the Virginia
executive council (acting presumably during a legislative recess)
authorized its delegates to discuss “regulating the prices of
Commodities within those States respectively, and of Goods imported
in the same.”176
The York Town Price Convention elected Lewis Burwell, a Virginia
commissioner, as chairman, and Thomas Annor, a non-commissioner,
as clerk.177 Like other gatherings of the type, the convention appointed
committees,178 particularly a ways-and-means committee, to
recommend a scheme of price controls for the consideration of the
entire assembly.179
The York Town minutes reveal that the delegates fully understood
that their role was only to propose to state legislatures, not to decide.180
Yet they could not agree on a proposal. When the ways-and-means
committee issued its report, the states split evenly on a motion to reject
it.181 A motion to amend the plan was voted down five states to one.182
173. 2 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 253–54, 257–58; 7 J. CONT. CONG. 121–22 n.4 (reporting
objections of Thomas Burke, delegate from North Carolina, to placing Virginia in convention of
middle states).
174. The York Town minutes have been hard to locate; even archivists in Pennsylvania and
in York were unaware that such a convention ever met. They can be found, however, in N.J.
SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 34–45 (1848).
175. Id. at 35.
176. The authorization of Virginia read as follows:
This Board, taking under their Consideration the Resolutions of Congress,
bearing date the 15th of [F]ebruary last, respecting the appointment of
Commissioners from this State, to meet Commissioners of several other States
at York Town in Pensylvania [sic] for regulating the prices of Commodities
within those States respectively, and of Goods imported in the same, do appoint
Lewis Burwell, and Thomas Adams esquires, commissioners for the purposes
aforesaid on Behalf of this State.
1 JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 359 (H, R, McIlwain ed., 1931) (Mar. 4,
1777).
177. N.J. SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 35–36.
178. Id. at 36, 38.
179. Id. at 36–37.
180. See id. at 40–42 (reproducing a proposed resolution to recommend various measures
to state legislatures).
181. On April 1, 1777, the record stated as follows:
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The deadlock appears to have been brought on, at least in part, because
many delegates did not believe price controls to be wise or effective
public policy.183 Accordingly, the convention voted on April 3 to send
copies of its proceedings to Congress and to the legislatures of the
participating states—and thereupon to dissolve.184
F. The Springfield Convention of 1777
On June 27, 1777, the Massachusetts legislature called for a
convention of “Committees from the General Assemblies” of the New
England states and New York.185 The legislature disseminated the call
in a circular letter sent to the other four states.186 The designated
location was Springfield, Massachusetts.187 The subject matter was
expansive, encompassing paper money, laws to prevent monopoly and
economic oppression, interstate trade barriers, and “such other matters
as particularly [c]oncern the immediate [w]elfare” of the participating
states.188 But it was limited by the stipulation that the convention
confine itself to matters “not repugnant to or interfering with the powers
and authorities of the Continental Congress.”189
Like the York Town and Providence gatherings, this was to be only
a proposal convention. The call asked that the delegates “consider”
measures and “report the result of their conference to the General
Courts [legislatures] of their respective States.”190 The convention’s

A motion was made and seconded, that the report be rejected, and the
question being put it was received in the negative, in the manner following: viz:
For the affirmative, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland.
For the negative, New York, New Jersey, Virginia.
Id. at 43.
182. Id. at 44.
183. Id. at 45.
184. Id. The exhaustion of the delegates is captured by the presiding officer’s certification
line on the resolution to adjourn: “LEWIS BURWELL, Chairman. Signed Thursday evening,
By candle-light, April 3, 1777.” Id.
185. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 601.
186. E.g., Letter from Jeremiah Powell to Nicholas Cooke, Governor of Rhode Island (July
2, 1777), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 280 (containing call).
187. 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 49–50; see also 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1,
at 601 (reproducing Massachusetts resolution); id. at 602 (reproducing New York resolution
reciting Massachusetts call).
188. 20 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 49–50.
189. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 599; 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 276 (reciting
and accepting the call); id. at 278 (appointing committee).
190. See 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 599.
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resolutions are consistent with that limitation.191
On July 30, eleven commissioners from all five states had
appeared.192 They included, among others, New York’s John Sloss
Hobart, who had attended at York Town, and several Providence
veterans: Titus Hosmer of Connecticut, Thomas Cushing of
Massachusetts, Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, and William
Bradford and Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island.193 Their credentials
mostly tracked the language of the call or, in the case of New York,
referred to the call when defining the scope of authority.194 State
officials were learning that uniformity is important when credentialing.
The mode of selection varied by state. A joint session of the
legislature had elected New Hampshire’s and Rhode Island’s
committees.195 In Massachusetts the legislature had chosen its
committee by the two chambers voting seriatim.196 In New York, the
council of safety selected the delegates, and in Connecticut the governor
and council of safety.197
As the Providence Convention had done, the Springfield gathering
elected Stephen Hopkins as President. It chose William Pynchon, Sr., a
non-commissioner, as clerk.198
It is a shame that more historical work has not been done on the
Springfield Convention,199 for it turned out to be an important and
productive assembly. It met only from July 30 through August 5, but
produced a series of significant recommendations on a range of
economic and military subjects.200 The day after adjournment, President
Hopkins submitted the convention proposals to “the Honorable
Congress, that such measures may be taken for that end as they in their
great wisdom shall think proper.”201 These recommendations formed the
basis for extensive congressional debate and further recommendations

191. E.g., id. at 603 (resolving “[t]hat it be earnestly recommended” and, again, “[t]hat it be
recommended”); id. at 604 (resolving “[t]hat it be recommended”); id. at 605 (resolving,“as the
opinion of this Committee”).
192. Id. at 600.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 600–02. The Connecticut commissions initially omitted the exception in favor of
the power of Congress, but then seemed to limit its delegates’ authority to the items in the call.
Id. at 601–02.
195. See id. at 600, 602.
196. See id. at 601.
197. Id. at 601, 602.
198. Id. at 605.
199. For example, Scott, supra note 1, which discusses the other New England conventions
dealing with prices, fails to mention Springfield.
200. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 605.
201. Id. at 605–06. Hopkins’ letter was read in Congress on August 18. 8 J. CONT. CONG.,
supra note 1, at 649–50.
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to the states,202 although not all recommendations were effectuated.203
G. The New Haven Price Convention of 1778 (and the Abortive
Meetings in Charleston and Fredericksburg)
On November 22, 1777, as part of continuing efforts to curb price
inflation, the Continental Congress issued calls for three separate multistate conventions.204 Congress requested that the eight northernmost
states meet at New Haven, Connecticut on January 15, 1778; that
202. 8 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 727, 731 (voting on September 10, 1777 to add five
members to committee to consider Springfield recommendations). For further response, see 9 id.
at 948, 953–58 (Nov. 22, 1777); id. at 967–970 (Nov. 26, 1777); id. at 970–971 (Nov. 27, 1777);
id. at 985 (Dec. 2, 1777); id. at 988–89 (Dec. 3, 1777); 10 id. at 43, 46 (Jan. 13, 1778); 11 id. at
758–60 (Aug. 7, 1778); 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 286 (appointing legislative committee
to encapsulate military supply recommendations in a bill).
203. Letter from William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island to Jonathan Trumbull,
Governor of Connecticut (May 16, 1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 424 (complaining
that Rhode Island had not received the troops promised from other states); Letter from William
Greene, Governor of Rhode Island to the Council of Massachusetts (May 31, 1778), in 8 R.I.
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 425 (same); Letter from Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of
Connecticut, to William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island (Jun. 5, 1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 443 (excusing failure to meet Connecticut quota); see 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 519–20 (representing to Congress the difficulty this failure has inflicted on Rhode
Island); Letter from Nicholas Cooke, Governor of Rhode Island, to General Sullivan (Mar. 30,
1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 526–27 (outlining same problems).
204. See 9 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 948, 955–57. The November 22 resolution
stated:
Resolved, That it be recommended to the legislatures, or, in their recess, to
the executive power of the respective states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts
bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pensylvania [sic], and Delaware, respectively, to appoint commissioners
to convene at New Haven, in Connecticut, on the 15 day of January next; and
to the states of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, respectively, to appoint
commissioners to convene at Fredericksburg, in Virginia, on the said 15 day of
January; and to the states of South Carolina and Georgia, respectively, to
appoint commissioners to convene at Charleston, on the 15 day of February
next; in order to regulate and ascertain the price of labour, manufactures,
internal produce, and commodities imported from foreign parts, military stores
excepted; and also to regulate the charges of inn-holders; and that, on the report
of the commissioners, each of the respective legislatures enact suitable laws, as
well for enforcing the observance of such of the regulations as they shall ratify,
and enabling such inn-holders to obtain the necessary supplies, as to authorize
the purchasing commissaries for the army, or any other person whom the
legislature may think proper, to take from any engrossers, forestallers, or other
person possessed of a larger quantity of any such commodities or provisions
than shall be competent for the private annual consumption of their families,
and who shall refuse to sell the surplus at the prices to be ascertained as
aforesaid, paying only such price for the same.
Id. at 956–57 (footnote omitted).
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Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina convene at Fredericksburg,
Virginia on the same day; and that South Carolina and Georgia gather
on February 15 at Charleston. I have found no evidence the latter two
conventions ever met.205
The call specified as the convention subject-matter developing a
comprehensive schedule of price controls for non-military products,
developing enforcement mechanisms, and empowering authorities to
seize goods from engrossers (hoarders). The call further provided that
state legislatures should adopt laws to implement “such of the
regulations as they shall ratify.”206 The precatory nature of that language
communicated that these gatherings, too, were to be merely agencies to
propose.
Like the York Town and Springfield meetings, the New Haven
Convention has received little scholarly attention.207 One reason may be
that its journal was so thin.208 Yet the gathering at New Haven was one
of the better-attended meetings of the kind. It was comprised of
committees from seven states: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
Delaware had been invited but did not send delegates.
The states had named 21 commissioners, but one from New Jersey
and two from Pennsylvania failed to attend. By January 15, three
committees had arrived; six days later, all seven were on hand.209
Except for the New York committee, all had been elected by their state
legislatures,210 with bicameral legislatures (Pennsylvania’s was
unicameral) voting either jointly or by chambers seriatim. The New
York committee was appointed by the state convention, a body that
served as the legislature when the regular legislature was in recess or
disrupted by the British.211
The convention elected Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts, a veteran
of both the First Continental Congress and of Providence and
205. Accord CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 18.
206. 9 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 957.
207. The principal treatment, Baldwin, supra note 1, is a sketchy and unsatisfying account
that spends much of its time on other events and gets some facts wrong (for example, claiming
that New Jersey delegate John Neilson was subsequently a delegate at the Constitutional
Convention). Id. at 46. This work is sometimes referred to by the consecutive titles of its first
two papers: “The New Haven Convention of 1778; The Boundary Line between Connecticut
and New York.”
208. See generally 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 607–20.
209. Id. at 610–11 (reporting that “[t]he Commissioners arrived from the State of
Pennsylvania” on that date).
210. The credentials stated how the committees were selected. Id. at 607–11; see also 8 R.I.
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 340 (reproducing Rhode Island’s acceptance of the congressional
call, and election of the commissioners by a joint ballot of both houses of the general assembly).
211. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 609–10 (setting forth resolution of New York
convention).
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Springfield, as its president. It chose Henry Daggett, a non-delegate, as
secretary.212 Besides Cushing, four other commissioners had convention
experience. William Floyd of New York had attended the First
Continental Congress. Robert Treat Paine of Massachusetts had been at
that Congress and at Springfield, as had Connecticut’s Roger Sherman.
Nathaniel Peabody of New Hampshire also had represented his state at
Springfield.213
On January 22, 1778, the New Haven convention adopted rules of
conduct. The content of those rules does not appear in the journal,
except the rule of suffrage: each state had one vote.214 Like other such
assemblies, the convention appointed its own committees.215
The official journal tells us little of the proceedings. It does
reproduce the lengthy text of the principal resolution,216 which in
accordance with the call is purely recommendatory.217 The journal
likewise includes a formal letter to Congress,218 a letter to the absent
state of Delaware,219 and a recommendation that states write circular
letters to other states assuring them that the senders had stopped issuing
paper money and were honoring congressional requisitions.220
The New Haven convention also exercised its prerogative not to
propose. For reasons it explained, the convention refused to list
maximum prices for certain items listed in the congressional call.221
The gathering apparently adjourned on February 1.222 Congress
received its recommendations on February 16.223 The convention
proposals were the subject of later congressional debate and some
implementation,224 and four states enacted its wage-price schedule into
212. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 607.
213. See Appendix A.
214. 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 611.
215. Id. at 612 (appointing committees “to draw up a report of the doings of this
Convention” and “draw up a letter” to Congress).
216. Id. at 613–18.
217. The resolution is not clearly identified as a recommendation until near the end. Id. at
618.
218. Id. at 618–19.
219. Id. at 619–20.
220. Id. at 620.
221. Id. at 615 (explaining why certain items of foreign production are excepted).
222. As unlikely as this appears, the journal seems to report that the delegates convened on
a Sunday (February 1) at 5:00 p.m. to adopt the circular-letter resolution and to adjourn. Id. at
620.
223. 10 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 170, 172 (Feb. 16, 1778).
224. Id. at 53, 55 (Jan. 15, 1778) (“[N]o limitation to be made by the Board of War, with
respect to price, shall contravene any . . . of the regulations which may be made hereafter by the
convention of committees which is to meet at New Haven, in Connecticut, on this fifteenth day
of January[].”). See also id. at 170, 172 (Feb. 16, 1778); id. at 258, 260 (Mar. 16, 1778); id. at
321–24 (May 8, 1778); 11 id. at 472 (May 7, 1778).
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law.225 Those price controls were soon repealed on the recommendation
of Congress, but adopted to an extent on the local level.226
H. The Hartford Convention of 1779227
As the Revolutionary War continued, the value of paper money
nosedived and trade wars grew among states.228 In a further effort to
coordinate interstate price controls and other economic policies, the
Massachusetts General Court (legislature) on September 28, 1779 called
yet another multi-state convention.229 Massachusetts invited New York
and the other New England states to meet at Hartford, Connecticut on
October 20.230 The call provided that the convention was to promote “a
free and general Intercourse . . . upon Principles correspondent with the
public Good, and effectually to cut up and destroy the Practices of those
People who prey both upon you and us . . .”231 The commissions of the
Massachusetts delegates instructed them specifically to explain the
motives for Massachusetts’ embargo law, to “concert . . . such Measures
as may appear proper to appreciate our Currency,” and to “open a free
and general Intercourse of Trade upon Principles correspondent with the
public Good.”232
The Massachusetts documents were not clear whether they
contemplated a mere consultation or a meeting at which committees
could “pledge the faith” of their respective governments. The call
denominated the convention as a “Consultation,” but stated that its
225. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 18; see also 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 521–22
(reproducing Governor Trumbull’s recommendation based on the New Haven resolutions); 8
R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 361 (reproducing resolution of the Rhode Island general
assembly accepting the convention proceedings); id. at 381 (accepting committee report for bill
controlling prices).
226. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 18; see Letter from Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of
Connecticut, to William Green, Governor of Rhode Island (May 19, 1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 423–24 (complaining of Rhode Island’s non-compliance); Letter from William
Green, Governor of Rhode Island, to Jonathan Trumbull, Governor of Connecticut (May 29,
1778), in 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 425 (explaining that Rhode Island cannot comply
until Massachusetts does).
227. As is true of the conventions at Providence, York Town, Springfield, and New Haven,
little has been written about the 1779 Hartford Convention. One must not confuse it with the far
more famous interstate gathering at Hartford in 1814.
228. Josiah Bartlett, who represented New Hampshire at 1779 Hartford conclave, observed
that “Land Embargoes” were then in effect in most of the five states at the convention. See
Letter from Josiah Bartlett to Nathaniel Peabody (Oct. 20, 1779), in BARTLETT PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 271.
229. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 165–66.
230. Id. at 165.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 175; see also 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 564 (reproduction of
Massachusetts resolution).
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commissioners would have “full Powers to appear on the Part of this
State.”233 The Massachusetts commissions used the verb “concert”
rather than merely “consult,” “deliberate,” or “recommend.”
The documents issued by the other states were clearer, but the
commissions issued by New Hampshire contradicted the rest. New
Hampshire authorized its delegates to “consult and agree” to virtually
any measures.234 Rhode Island authorized its commissioners only to
“meet” with the other delegates.235 Connecticut empowered its delegates
to “deliberate and consult,”236 and New York empowered its
commissioners to “consult and confer” on the subjects identified by
Massachusetts as well as any others that might arise.237 Because of
conflicting commissions, the convention could do no more than
propose.
The five states appointed 14 commissioners, of whom 13 attended.
Massachusetts appointed its committee by legislative action, as did
Connecticut and New York. In Rhode Island, commissioners were
designated by the council of war, to which the legislature had delegated
legislative power.238 In New Hampshire, they were appointed by the
committee of safety, charged with the affairs of state during legislative
recess.239
The proceedings opened promptly on October 20, 1779. The more
notable figures present included three Connecticut commissioners:
Eliphat Dyer, veteran of three prior conventions;240 Benjamin
Huntington, who had been at New Haven; and Oliver Ellsworth, new to
the convention circuit, but fated to be a central figure at the
Constitutional Convention and eventually Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.241 Representing Massachusetts were Thomas Cushing, now
serving in his fifth multi-state convention, and Nathaniel Gorham, who
eight years later would chair the Committee of the Whole in
Philadelphia.242 From New Hampshire came Josiah Bartlett, attending
his third convention, and from New York William Floyd and John Sloss
Hobart, each also attending his third. Stephen Hopkins, one of the two
Rhode Island delegates, was now serving in his fifth multi-state
233. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 165.
234. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563.
235. Id. at 564.
236. Id. at 564–65.
237. Id. at 565.
238. Supra note 151 and accompanying text.
239. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563–65.
240. See Appendix A (setting forth convention experience for each commissioner).
241. For a short sketch of Ellsworth’s contributions to this meeting and to the Philadelphia
Price Convention, see BROWN, supra note 1, at 72.
242. ROSSITER, supra note 1, at 171 (reporting Gorham’s chairmanship of the committee of
the whole).
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meeting. He was elected president, as he had been at Providence and
Springfield. In keeping with the tradition of choosing a non-delegate for
secretary, the assembly elected Lt. Col. Hezakiah Wyllys.243
With this kind of accumulated experience, it was scarcely necessary
to adopt formal rules, and the journal mentions none. After reproducing
the credentials, the journal does little but report final
recommendations.244 They included repeal of embargoes, supplying
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire with flour, and
further price regulations. Perhaps as a result of growing skepticism
about the efficacy of the latter, the convention stressed the need to
obtain supplies by taxing and borrowing rather than printing.245
The group also decided to propose yet another multi-state
convention. The call read as follows:
That a Convention of Commissioners from the States of
New
Hampshire,
Massachusetts,
Rhode
Island,
Connecticutt [sic], New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, be requested to meet at
Philadelphia on the first Wednesday of January next, for
the purpose of considering the expediency of limiting the
prices of merchandize and produce, and if they judge such
a measure to be expedient, then to proceed to limit the
prices of such of said articles as they think proper in their
several States in such manner as shall be best adapted to
their respective situation and circumstances, and to report
their proceedings to their respective Legislatures.246
As the italicized language suggests, decisions at the Philadelphia
meeting would bind their sovereigns. Hopkins’s circular letter to the
other states also asserted that the proposed Philadelphia convention
would “proceed to limit the prices” of articles, if it deemed proper.247
The Hartford Convention did not invite the three southernmost states
to Philadelphia. The purported reason was “[t]he great distance of North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.”248 Another possible reason is
that those states may have been even more skeptical about price controls

243. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 564. For his rank, see id. at 356.
244. Id. at 566–69.
245. Id. at 569. Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire believed that price controls remained
necessary because taxes would be insufficient to stabilize the currency. Letter from Josiah
Bartlett to Nathaniel Peabody (Nov. 4, 1779), in BARTLETT PAPERS, supra note 1, at 272–73.
246. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 568 (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 571.
248. Id. at 570.
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than some northerners were.249 Recall that all those states had refused to
honor the two congressional calls for price conventions at Charleston.250
After issuing its recommendations, the gathering adjourned,
probably on October 28.251 Its proceedings seem to have been generally
approved in Congress,252 and the convention’s price recommendations
served as the basis for some of Congress’s own price edicts.253
I. The Philadelphia Price Convention of 1780
The call for the Philadelphia Price Convention—yet another multigovernment gathering largely overlooked by scholars—was issued by
the preceding Hartford Convention.254 The Philadelphia Price
Convention was fated to be the final chapter in the sorry history255 of
Revolutionary-Era interstate price controls.
Of the ten states invited, seven attended.256 They were
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
249. See, e.g., Letter from the Connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut (Apr.
29, 1778), in 3 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 202 (quoting the Connecticut delegates to Congress as
doubting that the southern states would regulate prices).
250. See supra notes 172 and 205 and accompanying text.
251. The journal is not completely clear on that point, but the final documents are dated
October 28. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 570–71.
252. See Letter from Henry Marchant to William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island (Nov.
14, 1779), in 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 518–19 (expressing confidence that Congress would
approve the convention’s proceedings); Letter from Samuel Huntington to Oliver Wolcott (Nov.
26, 1779), in 4 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 527 (expressing a similar view).
253. 15 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 1287–91 (Nov. 19, 1779 resolution); Letter from
Elbridge Gerry to the President of Congress (Feb. 19, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 41–
42 (stating that Congress fixed the price of flour according to the price agreed on at Hartford).
254. See supra text accompanying note 246; see also 8 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 634
(reproducing Rhode Island resolution reciting the Hartford call while empowering a
commissioner to Philadelphia).
255. As one historian recounts:
Attempts at price control during the Revolution were all ineffectual. In
general even advocates of such regulation looked upon it as a temporary
expedient and palliative, while taxation, retrenchment in government
expenditures, no further emissions of irredeemable paper currency, and the
sinking of such paper already emitted were considered as the true cure for
inflationary prices. Most members of Congress realized that large issues of fiat
money would cause a decline in its value. . . . New Hampshire and other states
learned from trial that price ceilings could be imposed but that producers could
not be forced to sell their wares, that control often produced shortages in the
midst of plenty, that beef would appear on the market when ceilings were
removed and would vanish when they were imposed. People learned, too, that
black-market operations would flourish under regulation. . . .
See Scott, supra note 1, at 472.
256. Cf. BROWN, supra note 1, at 72 (alleging that four invited states did not show, but this
refers to the very beginning of the convention).
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Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. Those states were represented
by 20 commissioners, among them such experienced convention hands
as Connecticut’s Roger Sherman (three prior multi-state conventions)
Oliver Ellsworth and Samuel Huntington (each with one prior);
Delaware’s Thomas McKean (one), Maryland’s William Paca (one
prior, but also a signer of the Declaration of Independence); and New
Hampshire’s Nathaniel Folsom and Nathaniel Peabody (two each). This
was also the first multi-state convention for Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts, who like Ellsworth and Sherman would play a
significant role in writing the Constitution.257
State legislatures had elected all these delegates.258 In Massachusetts,
and perhaps in other states, the two chambers acted by joint ballot rather
than seriatim.259 Unicameral Pennsylvania required, of course, only the
vote of one house.260
The commissions empowering the delegates displayed more
uniformity than they had at Hartford. As requested by the call, all the
commissions authorized delegates to bind their respective states. For
example, New Hampshire empowered its commissioners “to limit the
prices of articles,”261 New Jersey to “consult and agree” and “confer and
agree,”262 and Massachusetts “to pledge the faith of this government.”263
These commissions restricted the scope of delegates’ authority to bind
their states to the subject of price limitation, sometimes with explicit
reference to the call.264 Additionally, Rhode Island empowered its
delegates to urge the convention to recommend repeal of state
embargoes.265
Initially, hopes had been high. In preparation for the convention,
some commissioners conferred during early January of 1780.266 Formal
proceedings began on January 29, 1780 in the Pennsylvania state house,

257. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 415.
258. Connecticut designated its delegates in Congress as commissioners. Id.
259. Id. at 573. Some of the other commissions are not clear on this point. See, e.g., id. at
576 (describing Pennsylvania’s selection of commissioners).
260. See PA. JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 398 (Nov. 18, 1779).
261. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 572.
262. Id. at 575. The New Jersey commission also empowered its committee to “report
whatever measures the said Convention may think proper to recommend, to this Legislature,” id.
at 576, but in light of the earlier wording this presumably applied to recommendations outside
the call.
263. Id. at 573.
264. The commissions are reproduced at id. at 572–77. The commissions of Connecticut
and New Jersey refer explicitly to Hartford. Id. at 574, 575.
265. Id. at 574 (reproducing resolution appointing William Ellery as commissioner).
266. Letter from Roger Sherman to Andrew Adams (Jan. 7, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra
note 1, at 4 (reporting that six commissioners from four states had met, as well as an
unauthorized representative from New York).
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the building now called Independence Hall.267 The convention elected
William Moore, then serving as vice president of Pennsylvania, as its
president. Contrary to custom, the commissioners elected one of their
number, Samuel Osgood of Massachusetts, as secretary.268 Because
Osgood was a delegate, the convention decided that in the president’s
absence Osgood was “authorized to take and declare the sense of the
[convention] on all questions that shall come before them.”269
The convention soon encountered snags. New Jersey had appointed
two delegates, but when the convention opened they were nowhere to
be found. The assembly wrote to request their attendance, apparently
without success.270 In addition, they wrote to New York and Virginia,
which also were absent.271
Most of the delegates believed that without the participation of
Virginia and New York, any general price-fixing agreement would
fail.272 The results for the convention were multiple adjournments and
inconclusive discussions.
Whatever the reason for New Jersey’s absence, the non-participation
by Virginia and New York seems to have been calculated. Virginia had
attended the abortive and frustrating price convention at York Town
(where it apparently had supported a price control recommendation),273
but when Congress later asked Virginia to convene with neighboring
states at Fredericksburg, it failed to do so.274 During the Philadelphia
gathering a New Jersey congressional delegate complained that
“Virginia seems to hang back; no members have attended frm [sic]
thence, and as far as I can learn none have been appointed.”275 As for
New York, there was no overt political basis for its absence, since the
government in Albany already had “pledge[d] the faith of the State for
carrying into effect a general plan for regulating prices . . . .”276 Nor was
there a practical basis, for Ezra L’Hommedieu, who had represented the
state at Hartford, was readily available. In fact, he had been in
Philadelphia meeting with authorized delegates since early January.277

267. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 572.
268. Id. at 577.
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 578.
272. Id.
273. Supra note 181 and accompanying text.
274. Supra note 205 and accompanying text.
275. Letter from Abraham Clark to Caleb Camp, Speaker of the Assembly (Feb. 7, 1780),
in N.J. SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 212.
276. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 578.
277. Letter from Roger Sherman to Andrew Adams (Jan. 7, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra
note 1, at 4 (reporting on L’Hommedieu’s meeting with six commissioners from four states).
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The fundamental reason for the failure of Virginia and New York to
cooperate may have been widespread doubts about the feasibility and
justice of price controls. Even in 1777, the same year Congress called
several price conventions, Dr. Benjamin Rush had argued that:
The wisdom & power of government have been employed
in all ages to regulate the price of necessaries to no
purpose. It was attempted in Engd in the reign of Edward II
by the English parliament, but without effect. The laws for
limiting the price of every thing were repealed, and Mr
Hume [David Hume, the historian and philosopher], who
mentions this fact, records even the very attempt as a
monument of human folly. The Congress with all its
authority have failed in a former instance of regulating the
price of goods.278
At the time, Rush’s views had been seconded by such leading figures as
James Wilson, Jonathan Witherspoon, and John Adams.279
Since 1777, reservations about the prudence of price controls had
grown. The York Town Price Convention had failed, and the
southernmost states had refused to hold any price conventions at all.
Where controls had been imposed, they had proved spectacularly
unsuccessful.280 So by the time the Philadelphia convention met,
“[e]nthusiasm for [price] regulation was on the wane.”281 In instructions
withheld from the rest of the convention, the Massachusetts legislature
had communicated to its own commissioners grave doubts about the
entire price-fixing enterprise.282
In an effort to rescue the situation, on February 7 an unnamed
commissioner moved several resolutions. One was to request the
presence of Virginia and another of New York. A third resolution was
to appoint a committee to draft a price-limitation plan. The journal is
unclear whether this motion was adopted, although it likely was.283
What is clear is that the following day the assembly adjourned until
April 4, apparently never to re-convene.284

278. Rush, Notes, supra note 1, at 135.
279. Id. at 137–38.
280. See Scott, supra note 1, at 472.
281. Id. at 471.
282. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 307–08 (reproducing a letter of instruction in
which perhaps half consisted of an attack on price controls’ that portion was deleted in the
convention version); see also 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 573.
283. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 578–79.
284. Id. at 579; see also BROWN, supra note 1, at 72–73; CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 19; PA.
JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 422 (Feb. 14, 1780).
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J. The Boston Convention of 1780
The Boston Convention of 1780 was the smallest of the Founding
Era multi-government conventions: five delegates from three states.285
Contemporaries sometimes referred to it as “the Committee from the
New England States”286 or the “Eastern Convention.”287 It has received
slightly more scholarly attention than most of the other Founding-Era
conventions.288
The motive for the gathering appears to have been military, although
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer of Maryland thought it might also have
been related to New York’s diplomatic movement away from New
England and toward Virginia.289 But no other motive other than military
appears in the records.
For the Americans, the military situation in 1780 was grave.
Moreover, New England (specifically Rhode Island) was hosting a
French army, and that army needed to be supplied. Letters from General
Washington asked Congress to ensure adequate supplies, and Congress
in turn urged the states to do so.290
The convention call came from Connecticut, and was addressed to
the other three New England states.291 It was initiated in a letter dated
July 14, 1780 from Governor Jonathan Trumbull to Governor William
Greene of Rhode Island in which Trumbell sought the support of Rhode
Island for the meeting.292 In the letter, Trumbull bemoaned the war
situation and noted the difficulties of supplying the French and their
irritation at high prices, and proceeded as follows:
To effect which, with the greater Expedition, we have
thought it necessary to send one of our Board [i.e., council]
to meet such Gentlemen as may be appointed from the
States of Rhode Island, Massachusetts and New
285. If 1768 be judged part of the Founding Era, the statement in the text must be qualified.
That year, only three colonies attended a meeting with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix (Rome),
rendering it as small (aside from the Iroquois) as the Boston Convention. The attending colonies
at Fort Stanwix were New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY, supra note
1, at 197.
286. Letter from Ezekial Cornell to William Greene (Aug. 29, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra
note 1, at 347.
287. Letter from James Duane to George Washington (Sept. 19, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra
note 1, at 378–79.
288. See generally BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1.
289. Letter from Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Thomas Sim Lee (Sept. 26, 1780), in 5
LETTERS, supra note 1, at 391–92.
290. See BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at ix–xxix (reproducing correspondence).
291. Baldwin, supra note 1, at 38; see BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 53–55
(reproducing letter); 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 153 (same).
292. See Letter from Jonathan Trumbull to William Green (July 15, 1780), in BOSTON
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 53–55.
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Hampshire, or such of them as shall concur in the Measure,
at Boston, as early next Week as possible, to confer on
these and other important Subjects peculiarly necessary at
this Day; to agree upon and adopt such similar Measures as
may be most conducive to the general Interest.
We have forwarded this Intimation by an Express to the
Council of War, at Providence; and if agreeable to them, it
is requested they would unite in their request with ours, to
the Council of War at Boston, by them immediately to be
communicated to the President and Council in New
Hampshire, for the Purpose that such Convention may be
held at Boston with all possible Expedition.293
The call seemed to ask for Rhode Island and Massachusetts
commissioners to be designated by those states’ councils of war and for
the New Hampshire commissioners to be appointed by the legislature.
However, a call from one sovereign could not dictate how other
sovereigns selected their delegates, as the convention realized by
seating delegates however selected. In Massachusetts and Connecticut,
the council of safety did appoint the commissioners, but in both of the
other states the authorities deviated from Governor Trumbull’s
suggested method of appointment. In New Hampshire, the delegate was
chosen not by the legislature, but by the committee of safety.294 In
Rhode Island, the governor referred the request to the general
assembly,295 which elected William Bradford.296
When the convention met on August 3, three commissioners from
Massachusetts were in attendance together with one each from
Connecticut and New Hampshire. Bradford, the Rhode Island delegate,
proved unable to attend.297
Three of the five commissioners had prior convention experience.
They were Nathaniel Gorham and Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts
and Jesse Root of Connecticut, who substituted for Eliphalet Dyer
(another seasoned conventioneer). Cushing had attended five previous
conventions.298 The group elected him president, and a non-delegate,

293. BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 54–55.
294. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559–60.
295. 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 161 (reproducing letters from Governor William
Greene of Rhode Island to the governor of Connecticut and the president of the council
[governor] of Massachusetts).
296. Id. at 172–73.
297. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559; see Letter from James Bowdoin, President of
Massachusetts Council, to William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island (July 24, 1780), in 9 R.I.
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 300 (complaining of Rhode Island’s absence).
298. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559.
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Henry Alline, clerk.299
This was a proposal convention merely. The Massachusetts
commission empowered delegates only to
consult and advise [deliberate] on all such business and
affairs as shall be brought under consideration, relative to
the war, and to promote and forward the most vigorous
exertions of the present campaign, and to cultivate a good
understanding and procure a generous treatment of the
officers and men of our great and generous Ally
[i.e., France], and make report thereof accordingly.300
The language of the other commissions was similar, except that New
Hampshire, as at Hartford, permitted its commissioner to wander farther
afield: He could “consult and advise . . . on any other matters that may
be thought advisable for the public good.”301
The journal tells us little about the substance of the convention,
except for a lengthy list of recommendations. Most dealt with matters of
military detail. However, the convention further recommended that land
embargoes be repealed and water embargoes be continued, that bills of
credit be sunk, and that those states that had not ratified the Articles of
Confederation do so.302 The recommendations dealing with bills of
credit and embargoes might seem to be outside the scope of the
convention, but prices and trade restrictions were key aspects of the
military struggle. In fact, the convention call included specific reference
to the need to protect the French army from “being imposed and
extorted upon by extravagant Prices by Individuals.”303 The convention
justified its two-fold recommendations on embargoes by stating that
land embargoes should be repealed because they tended to injure rather
than serve the common cause, while water embargos should remain
with “particular care . . . to prevent all illicit trade with the enemy.”304
Just as the first Hartford Convention had called the convention at
Philadelphia, the Boston gathering extended a conditional invitation to
any and all other states to a second meeting at Hartford.305 It adjourned
on August 9.306

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 561.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 561–64.
See BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 54.
3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 562.
Id. at 564.
Id.
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These proceedings and recommendations were praised in Congress
as consistent with congressional policies.307 General Washington wrote
that they were “the most likely Means that could be adopted to rescue
our Affairs from the complicated and dreadful Embarrassments under
which they labor, and will do infinite Honor to those with whom they
originate.”308 The Massachusetts legislature took note of the
recommendations that all states adhere to the Articles of Confederation
and that the confederation government be organized on a regular basis.
The Massachusetts legislature signaled its willingness to overlook the
unanimity rule and “to confederate with such other nine, or more, of the
United States, as will accede to the Confederation.”309
K. The Hartford Convention of 1780
The Boston Convention’s call to Hartford was conditional in form. It
read as follows:
And it is further recommended, that in case the war
continues and Congress should not take measures for the
purpose and notify the States aforesaid by the first of
November next, that the said States do at all events furnish
their quota of men and provisions, and charge the same to
the United States; and to procure uniformity in the
measures that may be necessary to be taken by these States
in common with each other, this Convention recommend a
meeting of Commissioners from the several States to be
held at Hartford on the 2d Wednesday of November next,
and invite the State of New York and others to join them
that shall think proper.310
Pursuant to this call, nine of the eleven commissioners elected by the
legislatures of New York and the four New England states gathered on
November 8, 1780.311 Among them was Rhode Island’s William
Bradford who also had been elected to the Boston Convention, but had
been unable to attend.312 The convention elected Bradford as its
307. See Letter from the Connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 1,
1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 1, at 351–52.
308. BOSTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at xxxii–xxxiii.
309. 21 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 640; cf. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of
the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution
between the States so ratifying the Same.”).
310. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563–64.
311. Id. at 564 (setting forth commissions and attendance list). Connecticut had elected as a
third member of its committee Andrew Adams, Jr., Id. at 179, but he withdrew for several
reasons. Id. at 237; 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 258–59 (reproducing legislative resolution).
312. Supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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president and Hezakiah Wyllys, a non-delegate, as secretary.313 Wyllys
had served as secretary at the Hartford gathering the previous year.314
During the proceedings, his father George (the Connecticut secretary of
state)315 replaced him for a time,316 but Hezekiah returned for the end.317
Most of the delegates were veterans of previous conventions.
Bradford was attending his third convention, Connecticut’s Eliphalet
Dyer his fifth, and Thomas Cushing of Massachusetts his seventh.
Cushing’s colleague, Azor Orne, was attending his second convention,
and John Sloss Hobart of New York his fourth.
The commissions issued by the New England states all specified
military affairs as the topic and limited their delegates to conferring and
recommending. New York commissioned its committee to consider “all
measures as shall appear calculated to give a vigor to the governing
powers equal to the present crises.”318 Accompanying the New York
commission were instructions to propose and agree to, in the said
Convention, “that Congress should, during the present War, or until a
perpetual Confederation shall be completed, be explicitly authorized
and empowered, to exercise every Power which they [i.e., Congress]
may deem necessary for an effectual Prosecution of the War . . . .”319 In
other words, the New York delegates had been instructed to seek a grant
of plenary power to Congress.
Nothing of the debates survives except for formal recommendations,
a letter to Congress, and a letter to the non-participating states. The
recommendations were sweeping, but all were connected with the war
and with issues of military funding and supply.320 New York’s proposal
to grant broad powers to Congress was not acted on.
Some of the recommendations were noteworthy. The convention
asserted that “the Commander-in-Chief ought to have the sole discretion
of the military operations, and an individual should have the charge of
each department.”321 Congress adopted the department proposal rather
313. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 564.
314. Supra note 243 and accompanying text.
315. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 6.
316. Id. at 569. For the relationship, see Portal for Online Museum Catalog, CONN. HIST.
SOC’Y MUSEUM & LIBR., http://emuseum.chs.org:8080/emuseum/ (search for “Hezekiah
Wyllys”; then follow second “Hezekiah Wyllys” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
317. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574. The transition from son to father and back to
father was not surprising. Three generations of Wyllyses held the office of secretary of
Connecticut continuously from 1712 to 1810. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 317
(editor’s note).
318. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 566.
319. THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AT THE
FIRST MEETING OF THE FOURTH SESSION BEGUN AND HOLDEN AT POUGHKEEPSIE IN DUTCHESS
COUNTY ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7TH, 1780 58–59 (Munsell & Rowland reprint, 1859)
320. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 570–72.
321. Id. at 573.
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quickly.322 The convention further recommended that states “pledge
their faith” to legally enforce congressional fund-raising decisions.323
This proposal became law, at least in theory, a few months later, when
the thirteenth state (Maryland) ratified the Articles of Confederation.
Frustrated by the failure of states to meet their fund-raising quotas,
the convention also recommended
the several states represented in this Convention, to instruct
their respective Delegates to use their influence in Congress
that the Commander-in-Chief . . . be authorized and
empowered to take such measures as he may deem proper
and the publick [sic] service may render necessary, to
induce the several States to a punctual compliance with the
requisitions which have been made or may be made by
Congress for supplies for the year 1780 and 1781.324
This proposed grant of near dictatorial authority to George Washington
proved controversial,325 and Congress never approved it.
The gathering apparently dissolved on November 22. That, at least,
was the date of the convention’s letter to the other states.326
L. The Abortive and Successful Providence Conventions of 1781
At the 1780 Hartford Convention the participating states called for
yet another meeting at an early date.327 The subject would be military
affairs, and the gathering would include representatives of the French
military stationed in Providence.328 On February 21, the Connecticut
general assembly asked that the call be expanded to include the request
of Vermont to be admitted to the union.329 Governor Trumbull
accordingly wrote to the other states announcing the expanded subject
matter.330 In the same letter, he fixed a meeting date of April 12,
322. See 19 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at ix (editor’s prefatory note); id. at 124–26 (Feb.
7, 1781); id. at 155–57 (Feb. 16, 1781). The convention’s recommendations were first noted in
Congress on December 12, 1780. 18 id. at 1141 (Dec. 12, 1780).
323. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 571.
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Letter from John Witherspoon to William Livingston, Governor of New
Jersey (Dec. 16, 1780), in 5 LETTERS, supra note 1 at 487; Letter from James Warren to Samuel
Adams (Dec. 4, 1780), in id. at 488 n.8.
326. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 573.
327. See Letter from Connecticut Governor Trumbull to Governor of Rhode Island (Mar. 9,
1781), in 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 378.
328. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 575–76.
329. Id. at 316–17 (Feb. 21, 1781); see also 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 343
(reproducing resolution).
330. E.g., Letter from Connecticut Governor Trumbull to Governor of Rhode Island (Mar.
9, 1781), in 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 378 (reproducing Trumbull’s circular letter).
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1781.331
At the appointed time, only five delegates had arrived: Thomas
Cushing from Massachusetts, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. from Connecticut,
and three Rhode Island commissioners. New York, New Hampshire,
and the French all failed to appear. Those present tarried until April 17,
then returned home. Before leaving, they agreed to “represent with
much regret to the several States, that the seeming neglect on this
occasion could not but give them a painful prospect . . . of any future
proposed meeting of the States,” and that “the interests of the States
might be subjected to very substantial detriment.”332
On June 12, 1781, the Massachusetts legislature issued a resolution
calling for the New England states to meet at Providence on June 25,
and appointing two Massachusetts commissioners.333 The call described
as the purpose of the gathering “to agree upon some regular method of
sending on supplies of beef, &c. to the army, during the present
year.”334 Only five delegates convened on June 26, but they represented
all four New England states. Two delegates were convention veterans:
Jabez Bowen of Rhode Island, who had been at New Haven, and John
Taylor Gilman of New Hampshire, a commissioner the preceding year
at Hartford. The little group chose Bowen as president and, contrary to
usual practice, one of its own members, Justin Ely of Massachusetts, as
clerk.335
This second Providence Convention made several supply
recommendations, and disbanded after its second day.336
M. On the Road to Annapolis: Abortive Conventions and the First State
Legislative “Application”
As noted earlier, the New York commissioners to the 1780 Hartford
Convention had been instructed to promote a grant of greater powers to
Congress.337 On July 21, 1782, that state’s legislature followed up with
a resolution concluding as follows:
It appears to this Legislature, that the foregoing
important Ends, can never be attained by partial
331. Id.; 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574.
332. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 575.
333. 1780–1781 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 614.
334. Id. at 614.
335. 3 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 575.
336. Id. at 575–76. At least one state, Rhode Island, proceeded to put some of the
recommendations into effect. 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 439–40 (reproducing legislative
resolution); Letter from Governor Greene to General Washington (July 11, 1781), in 9 R.I.
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 453–54 (outlining state’s compliance). The state paid Bowen £2/5s
for his service as commissioner. 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 453.
337. Supra Part III.K.
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Deliberations of the States, separately, but that it is
essential to the Common Welfare, that there should be as
soon as possible a Conference of the Whole on the Subject;
and that it would be advisable for this Purpose, to propose
to Congress to recommend, and to each State to adopt, the
Measure of assembling a General Convention of the States,
specially authorised to revise and amend the Confederation,
reserving a Right to the respective Legislatures, to ratify
their Determinations.338
Similarly, on February 13, 1783, the Massachusetts legislature called
a more modest convention: a meeting of New York and the New
England states to be held at Hartford
to confer . . . on the necessity of adopting within the said
States, for their respective uses, such general and uniform
system of taxation by impost and excise, as may be thought
advantageous to the said States, which system being agreed
on by the majority of the delegates so to be convened, shall
be recommended to the legislatures of the said States. . . .339
John Hancock, now occupying the newly-created office of
governor, extended the formal invitation to the other states.340
The Massachusetts call was extraordinary for the suggestion that
delegates vote as individuals rather than as states. None of the other
calls had attempted to specify voting rules for a proposed convention,
and all previous multi-government gatherings apparently had operated
on a one-state/one vote principle.341 This may explain the subsequent
response: Although in recess of the legislature, the governor and council
of safety of Connecticut appointed three commissioners,342 New
Hampshire and Rhode Island simply refused to do so. Massachusetts
rescinded the call the following month.343
Undaunted, on May 31, 1785, Massachusetts Governor James
Bowdoin addressed the state’s lawmakers, urging them to promote a
338. 5 DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, No. 11, Pt. 2, 28–29
(1904).
339. 1782–1783 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 382.
340. Letter from William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island, to John Hancock, Governor
of Massachusetts (Feb. 28, 1783), in 9 R.I. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 685 (stating, “I am
favored with your Excellency’s letter respecting the proposed convention of the five Eastern
states, which is now before our General Assembly”).
341. See generally Part III.
342. 5 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 101–02.
343. 1782–1783 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 482–83 (Mar. 26, 1783) (rescinding call
due to two states “having refused to choose delegates to meet”).
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“Convention or Congress” of “special delegates from the States” to
amend the Articles of Confederation and grant the Confederation
Congress more authority.344 The legislature responded on July 1 by
adopting the New York formula in a resolution asking Congress for a
general convention to revise the Articles.345 In its accompanying
circular letter to the other states, the legislature designated this action as
“[making] application to the United States in Congress assembled.”346
This pre-constitutional use of the word “application” is almost identical
to the use of that word in Article V. Previous discourse sometimes
referred to the call as an “application.”347
In addition to its “application” and circular letter, the Massachusetts
legislature issued a letter to the president of Congress. This asked
Congress “to recommend a Convention of the States at some convenient
344. See 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 709–10 (speech of May 31, 1785);
see also id. at 708.
345. The full text is as follows:
RESOLVE RECOMMENDING A CONVENTION OF DELEGATES FROM
ALL
THE
STATES,
FOR
THE
PURPOSE
MENTIONED.
As the prosperity and happiness of a nation, cannot be secured without a
due proportion of power lodged in the hands of the Supreme Rulers of the
State, the present embarrassed situation of our public affairs, must lead the
mind of the most inattentive observer to realize the necessity of a revision of the
powers vested in the Congress of the United States, by the Articles of
Confederation:
And as we conceive it to be equally the duty and the privilege of every
State in the Union, freely to communicate their sentiments to the rest on every
subject relating to their common interest, and to solicit their concurrence in
such measures as the exigency of their public affairs may require:
Therefore Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Court, that the present
powers of the Congress of the United States, as contained in the Articles of
Confederation, are not fully adequate to the great purposes they were originally
designed to effect.
Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Court, that it is highly expedient, if
not indispensibly necessary, that there should be a Convention of Delegates
from all the States in the Union, at some convenient place, as soon as may be,
for the sole purpose of revising the confederation, and reporting to Congress
how far it may be necessary to alter or enlarge the same.
Resolved, That Congress be, and they are hereby requested to recommend a
Convention of Delegates from all the States, at such time and place as they may
think convenient, to revise the confederation, and report to Congress how far it
may be necessary, in their opinion, to alter or enlarge the same, in order to
secure and perpetuate the primary objects of the Union.
1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 666 (July 1, 1785).
346. Circular Letter of the Massachusetts General Court to the Supreme Executive of Each
State (July 1, 1785), in 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 667.
347. E.g., 1 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 589.
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place, on an early day, [so] that the evils so severely experienced from
the want of adequate powers in the foederal [sic] Government, may find
a remedy as soon as possible.”348 The legislature issued formal
instructions to Massachusetts’ congressional delegates to promote the
application.349
Yet Congress failed to act.
While New York and Massachusetts were promoting a general
convention, Pennsylvania decided to seek another regional one.
Pennsylvanians wished to improve the navigability of the Susquehanna
and Schuykill Rivers,350 and Marylanders wished to improve the
navigability of the Susquehanna.351 Pennsylvanians also discussed
connecting Susquehanna and Schuylkill River navigation by digging a
canal across what is now called the Delmarva Peninsula,352 a project
that would require cooperation from Maryland and Delaware. The latter
state was, however, upset with both of its neighbors because of the
tariffs imposed on Delawareans when they imported goods through
Baltimore and Philadelphia.353
Pennsylvania political leaders suggested a tri-state convention to
foster a comprehensive settlement. On November 18, 1785, a committee
of Pennsylvania’s unicameral General Assembly proposed
that a negociation [sic] be entered into with the States of
Maryland and Delaware upon the ground of reciprocal
advantages to be derived, to all the States concerned, from
a communication between the said two Bays as well as
from an effectual improvement of the navigation of the
river Susquehanna and its streams.354
On November 23, the assembly authorized the Supreme Executive
Council to open negotiations.355 On November 25, the council
president, Benjamin Franklin, sent a letter of invitation to the governor
of Maryland.356 The next day, the council vice president, Charles Biddle
(who seems to have been carrying much of the burden for the aged
348. 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 667 (italics omitted) (July 1, 1785).
349. Id. at 668 (July 1, 1785).
350. See Lillard, supra note 1, at 10–11; 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 128–30 (1783
legislative committee report); id. at 312 (election of replacement commissioner on subject); id.
at 315 (committee report received).
351. See Lillard, supra note 1, at 11.
352. See id. at 16; see also MINUTES, PA. ASSEMBLY, supra note 1, at 29 (proposed bill
from 1st session, November 8, 1785).
353. Lillard, supra note 1, at 12.
354. 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 538 (Nov. 18, 1786).
355. 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 582.
356. Id. at 585; see also 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 540 (containing the text of the
letter).
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Franklin), dispatched a similar invitation to Delaware.357 The
negotiations were to be “for the purpose of opening ‘a navigable
communication between the Bays of Chesepeak [sic] and Delaware, and
for an effectual improvement of the river Susquehanna, and its
streams.’”358 Consistently with the wording of these letters, the
proposed meeting came to be referred to as the “Navigation
Convention,” to distinguish it from the more general “Commercial
Convention” then being planned for Annapolis.
Commissioners at the navigation conclave would negotiate, but any
results were to constitute proposals only. There was no suggestion that
the convention would bind the participating states.
Delaware’s initial reaction was negative. In January, 1786, a
committee of that state’s legislature recommended against participating.
The reason cited was that the proposed canal would devalue Delaware’s
carrying trade. The committee recommended instead that the legislature
concentrate on improving the roads spanning the peninsula.359
Maryland was willing to meet, provided the agenda be expanded
beyond improvements on the Susquehanna and the projected canal. On
February 20, Maryland lawmakers approved participation if the meeting
included “other subjects which may tend to promote the commerce, and
mutual convenience of the said states.”360 On the same day, a joint
legislative session elected its commissioners: Samuel Chase, Samuel
Hughes, Peregrine Lethrbury, William Smith, and William Hemsley.361
A few days later, Vice President Biddle wrote to the Pennsylvania
legislature celebrating this progress, and advocating that his state also
participate in Virginia’s proposed “Commercial Convention” at
Annapolis. Biddle added that Navigation Convention negotiations had
begun, but failed to mention when or where.362
In March, 1786, the Maryland legislature authorized its Navigation
Convention delegates to discuss interstate tariffs.363 The following
month, the Pennsylvania assembly authorized payment for its delegates
and selected its committee: Francis Hopkinson (who had signed the
Declaration of Independence), John Ewing, David Rittenhouse (the
famous astronomer), Robert Milligan and George Lattimer.364
357. 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 540–41.
358. Id. at 540.
359. Report upon the President’s Message, Jan. 11, 1786 (read, Jan. 16, 1786) (on file with
Delaware State Archives).
360. See generally PROCEEDINGS, MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 1, at 149–50 (Feb.
20, 1786); id. at 199 (Mar. 12, 1786).
361. PROCEEDINGS, MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 1, at 150 (Feb. 20, 1786).
362. See 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 644–45 (Feb. 22, 1786).
363. PROCEEDINGS, MD. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 1, at 199 (Mar. 12, 1786).
364. 10 PA. ARCHIVES, supra note 1, at 755; 15 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 2
(Apr. 5, 1786). There were some delays in selecting the Pennsylvania commissioners. 14
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Delaware finally responded positively in June, approving
participation in both the Navigation Convention and the more general
Annapolis Commercial Convention.365 As its Navigation Convention
committee, Delaware lawmakers chose William Killen; Gunning
Bedford, Jr.; John Jones; Robert Armstrong, and Eleazar McComb.366
Authority was limited to proposing only, but encompassed not only the
Susquehanna and the canal, but “any other subject that may tend to
promote the commerce and the mutual convenience of the said
states.”367
It is doubtful whether the three state committees ever met or even
corresponded. In August, 1786, President Benjamin Franklin reported to
the Pennsylvania assembly that “[s]ome farther progress has been made
in the negociation [sic] with the States of Delaware and Maryland since
your last session: Commissioners have been appointed, an interview
proposed, and every inclination to meet this Commonwealth on the
ground of reciprocal advantage discovered [revealed].”368 This
statement of “progress” rather more suggests a lack of substantive
discussion than its occurrence.
The reasons the Navigation Convention proved abortive are not fully
understood. One reason may have been that the invitations issued by
President Franklin and Vice President Biddle (essentially, the
convention “call”) were radically defective: Unlike all successful calls,
they failed to specify a time and place of meeting. Also, the project may
have been lost amid the more momentous bustle in Annapolis and
Philadelphia. Once the Navigation Convention’s scope was extended
beyond two specific projects to include commerce in general, it
overlapped the topics on the agenda in Annapolis and Philadelphia. Not
surprisingly, therefore, both contemporaneous accounts and subsequent
generations sometimes mistook Navigation Convention records for
those pertaining to Annapolis.369
MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 669 (assigning a future date for the election); id. at 672
(postponing the date and erroneously stating the date of the original resolution as March 21
instead of March 23).
365. See MINUTES, DELAWARE COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 970–72; PROCEEDINGS,
DELAWARE ASSEMBLY, supra note 1, at 375–76 (June 15, 1786).
366. MINUTES, DELAWARE COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 971. For the commissions’
backgrounds, see id. at 25 (editors’ introduction).
367. PROCEEDINGS, DELAWARE ASSEMBLY, supra note 1, at 376.
368. 15 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 70 (Aug. 25, 1786).
369. See, e.g., 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 672 (erroneously identifying the
resolution authorizing the Navigation Convention, adopted March 23, 1786, with the Annapolis
Convention resolution adopted on March 21, 1786); see also MINUTES, PA. ASSEMBLY, supra
note 1, at 227 (2d Session, Mar. 21, 1786) (regarding the Annapolis resolution); id. at 230 (Mar.
23, 1786) (regarding the National Convention resolution).
A Delaware archivist has informed me that records in his office pertaining to the Navigation
Convention were erroneously filed in the location for the Annapolis Convention. E-mail from
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N. The Annapolis Commercial Convention of 1786
More concrete progress toward another multi-state convention came
from Virginia. Successful negotiations with Maryland in March, 1785
over Potomac and Chesapeake navigation rights encouraged Virginia
political leaders to seek further inter-governmental cooperation.370 On
January 21, 1786, the state legislature adopted a resolution calling a
convention
to take into consideration the trade of the United States; to
examine the relative situations and trade of the States; to
consider how far a uniform system in their commercial
regulations may be necessary to their common interest and
their permanent harmony; and to report to the several States
such an act relative to this great object, as, when
unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States
in Congress effectually to provide for the same.371
This call was for a general, not a mere regional, convention. Its subject
matter was commerce. Thus, in the contemporaneous records, the
Annapolis conclave often is referred to as a “commercial
convention.”372
The Virginia legislature followed up this resolution with a circular
letter inviting the other states to meet on “the first Monday in
September next,” September 4, 1786.373 In March, Governor Bowdoin
excitedly relayed the news to Massachusetts lawmakers,374 and three
months later those lawmakers elected four delegates375 and fixed their
compensation.376 Shortly thereafter, they empowered the governor and
council to fill any vacancies.377
Yet a full week after the convention was to have met, the
Massachusetts delegates were still absent. So also were the appointed
commissioners from Rhode Island. Only five states were in attendance,
represented collectively by 12 commissioners. The states were New
Bruce H. Haase to Robert G. Natelson (Aug. 13, 2012) (on file with author).
370. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 22.
371. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 15 (2d ed. 1937) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting HOUSE OF DELEGATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
1786, 153 (Thomas W. White ed. 1828)).
372. See, e.g., 14 MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 645 (Feb. 23, 1785); 15
MINUTES, PA. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 82, 86 (Sept. 20, 1786).
373. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 23 (quoting 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at
180).
374. See 1784–85 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 915 (communication of March 20,
1786).
375. 1786–87 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 286–87.
376. Id. at 304.
377. Id. at 312.
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York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The
commissioners from Massachusetts and Rhode Island were to learn in
mid-journey that the meeting already had adjourned.378
The delegates present included several convention alumni. John
Dickinson of Pennsylvania and served in the Stamp Act Congress, and
also in the First Continental Congress with his colleague, George
Read.379 New York’s Egbert Benson had been at Hartford in 1780.380
There also were notable newcomers: James Madison and Edmund
Randolph of Virginia, Alexander Hamilton of New York, William
Houston of New Jersey, and Richard Bassett of Delaware. All these
newcomers were to represent their states in Philadelphia the following
year—as would Dickinson and Read. Also present were Tench Coxe of
Pennsylvania and St. George Tucker of Virginia, both of whom became
highly influential in molding the public’s perception of the
Constitution.381
The delegates’ credentials closely tracked the call,382 except that
those of Delaware stipulated that any convention proposal had to be
reported “to the United States in Congress assembled, to be agreed to by
them, and confirmed by the Legislatures of every State.”383
The commissioners unanimously elected Dickinson, then the most
distinguished of their number, as Chairman. The proceedings do not
disclose a secretary.
Although other multi-state conventions had succeeded with a
representation from only five states, the delegates did not believe that
number was sufficient for crafting a trade regime national in scope.384
They therefore took the same course the commissioners at the abortive
1781 Providence convention had taken—they issued a statement and
adjourned. The statement read in part as follows:
Your Commissioners, with the most respectful deference,
beg leave to suggest their unanimous conviction, that it
may essentially tend to advance the interests of the union, if
378. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 24. Caplan blames the tardiness of their appointment, but the
Massachusetts legislature had appointed its commissioners on June 17. See 1786–87 MASS.
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 286–87.
379. 1 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 13–14, 74.
380. 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 565.
381. Coxe was among the most influential Federalist essayists during the ratification fight.
JACOB E. COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 111 (1978) (describing Coxe’s
influence). Tucker wrote the first formal legal commentary on the Constitution, THE VIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1803).
382. Proceedings, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp (last
visited Apr. 21, 2013).
383. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
384. Id. (“Your Commissioners did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of
their mission, under the Circumstance of so partial and defective a representation.”).
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the States, by whom they have been respectively delegated,
would themselves concur, and use their endeavours [sic] to
procure the concurrence of the other States, in the
appointment of Commissioners, to meet at Philadelphia on
the second Monday in May next, to take into consideration
the situation of the United States, to devise such further
provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the
constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the
exigencies of the Union; and to report such an Act for that
purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as
when agreed to, by them, and afterwards confirmed by the
Legislatures of every State, will effectually provide for the
same.385
The first italicized passage makes it clear that the Annapolis
Convention was directing its resolution to the five states that had sent
commissioners—not to other states, and not to Congress.
The second italicized passage contemplated a convention that could
do more than merely propose changes in the Articles of Confederation.
It contemplated a convention to propose changes “to render the
constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of
the Union.” The word “constitution” in this context was not limited to
the Articles of Confederation, as some modern writers assume. The
prevailing political definition of “constitution” at the time was the
political structure as a whole—much as we refer today to the British
“constitution.” Although Americans had begun to apply the word a few
years earlier to specific documents organizing state governments, the
usage was not yet dominant, and no contemporaneous dictionary
defined “constitution” that way.386 What we today call a “constitution”
was more often called an “instrument,” “frame,” “system,” or “form” of

385. Id. (emphasis added).
386. See, e.g., 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1775) (“The act of constituting, the state of being, the corporeal frame, the temper
of the mind, and established form of government, a particular law.”); NATHAN BAILEY, AN
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1783) (“[A]n ordinance or decree;
the state of the body; the form of government used in any place; the law of a kingdom.”);
SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1786 ed.) (giving as political
meanings “[e]stablished form of government; system of laws and customs” and “[p]articular
law; establishment; institution”); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1789) (similar definitions).
Perhaps the closest analogue in these definitions to the modern use of “constitution” is the
phrase “particular law,” a usage deriving from the Roman constitutio, which denominated any
official ruling by the emperor. WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 127 (J.M. Kelly trans., 2d ed. 1973).
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government.”387 Thus, the Annapolis report was recommending a
convention to consider and propose alterations in the federal political
system, not merely to the Articles. Subsequent proceedings in Congress
confirm that understanding.388
The Annapolis Convention adjourned on September 14, and
Chairman Dickinson’s letter on its behalf was read in Congress on
September 20.389 On October 11, Congress referred the letter to a
committee for consideration.390 But Congress took no further action for
several months.
O. The Constitutional Convention of 1787
It is commonly said that the Constitutional Convention was called by
Congress for the sole purpose of recommending changes in the Articles
of Confederation, and that by writing an entirely new Constitution the
delegates exceeded their authority. The claim was first raised during the
ratification debates by opponents of the Constitution—and not always in
good faith.391
The facts are otherwise: Congress did not call the Constitutional
Convention, Congress had no power to limit its scope, and the
overwhelming majority of delegates did not exceed their authority.
The commissioners at the Annapolis Convention had recommended
to the five states they represented that those states “concur, and use their
endeavours to procure the concurrence of the other States, in the
appointment of Commissioners, to meet at Philadelphia. . . .”392
Arguably, this represented the formal call to Philadelphia. If not, the
call had come by November 23, 1786 from the Virginia and New Jersey
legislatures.393
The Virginia resolution of that date was similar to state calls for at
least two prior conventions in that the invitation was implied in the

387. Even when states began to entitle their basic laws as “constitutions,” they often
included the more established titles as well. E.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776 (“Constitution, or System
of Government”); MD. CONST. of 1776 (“Constitution and Form of Government”); MASS.
CONST. of 1780, pmbl. (“declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitution”); VA
CONST. of 1776 (“Constitution or Form of Government”).
388. Infra Part III.N.
389. See 31 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 677–80.
390. Id. at 770.
391. See, e.g., A Georgian, GAZETTE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 236–37 (an anti-federalist tract that misrepresents
the delegates’ authority by substituting “the articles of confederation” for “the federal
constitution” in quoting their commission).
392. Proceedings, supra note 385 and accompanying text.
393. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559, 563.
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appointment of commissioners.394 It read as follows:
Be It Therefore Enacted . . . that seven Commissioners be
appointed by joint Ballot of both Houses of Assembly who
or any three of them are hereby authorized as Deputies
from this Commonwealth to meet such Deputies as may be
appointed and authorized by other States to assemble in
Convention at Philadelphia as above recommended and to
join with them in devising and discussing all such
Alterations and farther Provisions as may be necessary to
render the Foederal [sic] Constitution adequate to the
Exigencies of the Union and in reporting such an Act for
that purpose to the United States in Congress as when
agreed to by them and duly confirmed by the several States
will effectually provide for the same.395
This resolution followed the Annapolis formula in suggesting that
the convention propose any “Alterations and farther Provisions as may
be necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution [i.e., the political
system]396 adequate.” Perhaps significantly, the language provided not
for approval by every state (as had the Annapolis recommendation), but
by the “several [individual] States”—leaving open the possibility that
changes could bind the assenting states even in the absence of
unanimous approval. This was a formula for a convention with
plenipotentiary, rather than limited, proposal power.397
On November 23, 1786, the same day Virginia acted, New Jersey
commissioned several delegates “for the purpose of taking into
Consideration the state of the Union, as to trade and other important
objects, and of devising such other Provisions as shall appear to be
necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal Government
adequate to the exigencies thereof.”398 New Jersey made no mention of
consent by Congress or the other states.
On December 30, the Pennsylvania legislature also decided to send
commissioners to Philadelphia, reciting as a reason the prior resolution
of Virginia and empowering its delegates according to the Virginia
394. E.g., AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 138 and accompanying text (quoting the call
for the 1776–77 Providence Convention); Proceedings, supra note 333 and accompanying text
(discussing the call for the 1781 Providence Convention).
395. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559–60 .
396. Supra Part III.M.
397. Cf. Letter from James Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 297, 299 (distinguishing between a convention recurring
to “first principles,” which depends on the unanimous consent of the parties who are to be
bound by it and a convention for proposing amendments under “the forms of the Constitution,”
binding even non-consenting states).
398. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 563.
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formula.399 By mid-February of the following year, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia (in that order) also had
selected commissioners, or authorized the selection of
commissioners.400 All granted them broad power to propose reform, and
none limited them to merely proposing changes in the Articles.401 Thus,
seven states already had enlisted in the cause, and none had restricted its
delegates to revising the Articles.
On February 21, 1787, the congressional committee to which
Dickinson’s Annapolis letter had been entrusted moved that Congress
“strongly recommend” to the states that they send delegates to a
convention that would devise “such farther provisions as shall render
the same adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”402 At that point, the
New York congressional delegates, citing their instructions, objected.
They moved to postpone the committee report, and they offered a
resolution by which Congress would recommend to the states a
convention only “for the purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation.”403 Their insistence on that wording confirms that
people understood that the convention recommended by the delegates at
Annapolis, endorsed by seven states, and promoted by the congressional
committee was not limited to proposing changes in the Articles.

399. Id. at 565–66 (directing commissioners “to meet such Deputies as may be appointed
and authorized by the other States, to assemble in the said Convention at the City aforesaid, and
to join with them in devising, deliberating on, and discussing, all such alterations and further
Provisions, as may be necessary to render the foederal [sic] Constitution fully adequate to the
exigencies of the Union”).
400. 3 id. at 567–77.
401. E.g., id. at 568 (showing that North Carolina elected its delegates in January 1787); id.
at 571–72 (showing the New Hampshire resolution passing on January 17, 1787); id. at 574
(showing the Delaware authorization as passing on February 3, 1787); id. at 576–77
(reproducing the Georgia ordinance, adopted February 10, 1787).
The wording of each commission varied somewhat, with some phrases repeating
themselves:
North Carolina: “for the purpose of revising the Foederal [sic] Constitution . . . To hold,
exercise and enjoy the appointment aforesaid, with all Powers, Authorities and Emoluments to
the same belonging or in any wise appertaining.” Id. at 567–68.
New Hampshire: “devising & discussing all such alterations & further provisions as to render
the federal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.” Id. at 572.
Delaware: “deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further Provisions as may be
necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.” Id.
at 574.
Georgia: “devising and discussing all such Alterations and farther Provisions as may be
necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union.” Id. at 56–
77.
402. 32 J. CONT. CONG., supra note 1, at 71–72 (Feb. 21, 1787).
403. Id. at 72.
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New York’s motion to postpone was defeated, with only three states
voting in favor.404 However, Massachusetts then successfully obtained a
postponement, and offered a substitute resolution.405 This resolution
was adopted.406
Notably, the successful resolution neither “called” a convention nor
made a recommendation. In fact, it omitted the language of
recommendation in the committee proposal and in the New York
motion. The adopted resolution merely asserted that “in the opinion of
Congress it is expedient” that a convention be
held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of
revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to
Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and
provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and
confirmed by the States render the federal Constitution
adequate to the exigencies of Government and the
preservation of the Union.407
It is, perhaps, truly extraordinary that so many writers have repeated
the claim that Congress called the Constitutional Convention and legally
limited its scope. First, the Confederation Congress had no power to
issue a legally-binding call.408 If the states decided to convene, as a
matter of law they—not Congress—fixed the scope of their delegates’
authority.409 Second, the Articles gave Congress no power to limit that
scope. To be sure, Congress, like any agent, could recommend to its
principals a course of action outside congressional authority. But this is
not the same as legally restricting the scope of a convention. Third, by
its specific wording the congressional resolution was not even a
recommendatory call or restriction. As shown above, Congress dropped
the formal term “recommend” in favor of expressing “the opinion of
Congress.”
Despite Congress’s expression of its “opinion,” none of the seven
states that had decided to participate in the convention narrowed their
commissions. On the contrary, the list of states favoring a
plenipotentiary proposing convention continued to grow. Connecticut,
Maryland, and South Carolina all gave their delegates broad authority to
404. Id. at 73.
405. Id. at 73–74.
406. Id. at 73.
407. Id. at 74 (internal footnote omitted).
408. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. II (“Each State retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).
409. See CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 97; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 1, at
199 (James Madison).
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propose.410 Only Massachusetts and New York restricted their
commissions to amending the Articles.411 This is why, during the
convention proceedings it was a Massachusetts delegate, Elbridge
Gerry, who questioned to that assembly’s authority venture beyond
changes in the Articles,412 and why two of the three New York delegates
left early.413 Of the 39 delegates who signed the Constitution, only
three—Rufus King and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts and
Alexander Hamilton of New York414—could be charged credibly with
exceeding their powers.
The credentials of the Delaware commissioners, while broad enough
to authorize scrapping most of the Articles, did impose an important
limitation: they were not to agree to any changes that altered the rule
that “in the United States in Congress Assembled each State shall have
one Vote.”415 However, the Constitution’s bicameral Federal Congress
was a very different entity with very different powers than the
Confederation’s “United States, in Congress Assembled,”416 so the
Delaware delegates could maintain that they had stayed within their
commissions. Moreover, any convention delegate could point out that
the law permitted an agent to recommend to his principals a course of
action outside the agent’s sphere of authority; such recommendations
merely had no legal effect.417 As James Wilson summed up the
delegates’ position, they were “authorized to conclude nothing,
410. Connecticut resolved that
for the purposes mentioned in the said Act of Congress that may be present and
duly empowered to act in said Convention, and to discuss upon such
Alterations and Provisions agreeable to the general principles of Republican
Government as they shall think proper to render the federal Constitution
adequate to the exigencies of Government and, the preservation of the Union.
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 585 (emphasis added). Maryland gave its
delegates authority to “consider[] such Alterations and further Provisions as may be
necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the
Union.” Id. at 586. Finally, South Carolina granted authority for “devising and
discussing all such Alterations, Clauses, Articles and Provisions, as may be thought
necessary to render the Foederal [sic] Constitution entirely adequate to the actual
Situation and future good Government of the confederated States.” Id. at 581.
411. Id. at 584–85 (reproducing Massachusetts credentials); id. at 579–80 (reproducing
New York credentials).
412. See 2 id. at 42–43.
413. See 1 id. at xiv (editor’s comments).
414. The charge is less credible with respect to Hamilton than with respect to King and
Gorham. Because the majority of his delegation had gone home, arguably Hamilton no longer
could act as a commissioner from New York and signed, therefore, only as an individual.
415. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 574–75 (internal quotation marks omitted).
416. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1778, art. II.
417. Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 723.
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but . . . at liberty to propose any thing.”418
The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was the largest meeting its
kind since the First Continental Congress, including 55 commissioners
from 12 states.419 It also lasted more than three and a half months,
longer than any other American eighteenth century multi-government
convention.420 Because of the quality of its deliberation, the
completeness of its record, and the quality of its product, it deservedly
has become the most famous meeting of its kind.
Yet in other ways it was unremarkable. The composition, protocols,
rules, and prerogatives of the convention were well within the pattern
set by prior multi-colonial and multi-state gatherings. This was to be
expected, since at least 17 commissioners in Philadelphia had attended
prior multi-government conventions. Some particularly influential
delegates, such as John Dickinson, Roger Sherman, and Oliver
Ellsworth, were veterans of several.
As was true of prior assemblies of this kind, the overwhelming
majority of delegates at Philadelphia were selected by the state
legislatures.421 The only exception occurred when Governor Edmund
Randolph of Virginia selected James McClurg to replace Patrick Henry
(who had refused to serve), in accordance with a legislative
authorization to the governor to fill vacancies.422 As at prior
conventions, the delegates all were empowered through commissions
issued by their respective states, and were subject to additional state
instructions. All but a handful of delegates remained within the scope of
their authority or, if that was no longer possible, returned home.423
As in prior multi-government conventions, the rule of suffrage was
one vote per state committee. As at previous conventions, the journal
listed states from north to south, and they voted in that order. As in all
the previous conventions discussed in this Part III other than the Albany
Congress, the assembly elected its own president from among the
commissioners present—in this case, George Washington.424 In
accordance with established custom also, the Constitutional Convention

418. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 253. Wilson’s use of “proposed” here means
“recommend.” This should not be confused with the technical term employed in Article V. See
Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, Part XI.A.
419. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 557–59.
420. 1 id. at xi (introductory notes).
421. 3 id. at 559–86 (reproducing credentials).
422. 2 id. at 562–63.
423. Thus, Robert Yates and Robert Lansing, two of the three commissioners from New
York (which had granted them only limited authority) returned home early. ROSSITER, supra
note 1, at 252. Caleb Strong from Massachusetts, another state granting only limited authority,
also left early. Id. at 211
424. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 1–2.
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elected its own secretary, William Jackson, and other officers.425 In
choosing a secretary, it followed the usual practice of selecting a nondelegate.
As previous gatherings had done, the Constitutional Convention
adopted its own rules,426 kept its own journal, established and staffed its
own committees,427 and fixed its periods of recess and adjournment. In
fundamental structure, protocol, and practices, there were few, if any,
innovations.
IV. DID PRIOR MULTI-GOVERNMENT CONVENTIONS FORM THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR THE AMENDMENTS CONVENTION?
The legal force of the Constitution’s words and phrases depends, at
least in part (and some would argue “entirely”), on the meaning of the
words communicated to the ratifiers when they approved the
document.428 What the words communicated included not only their
strict meaning, but the attributes and incidents implied by them. Hence
the modern observer needs to consult contemporaneous customs and
usages to understand the words fully.
The phrase “Convention for proposing Amendments” denoted a
general convention.429 To be “general” it was not necessary that every
state participate, or even that every state be invited. The founding
generation had experienced four gatherings then called general
conventions—the Stamp Act Congress, the First Continental Congress,
the Constitutional Convention, and the Philadelphia Price Convention,
and none included every British colony in North America nor every
state. The criterion that rendered a convention “general” rather than
“partial” was not that every colony or state participated, but that the
convention was not limited by region (at least not entirely)430—and that
most colonies or states did take part.
This renders it easier to understand that in all attributes other than
inclusivity, a general convention was the same creature as a regional or
“partial” convention. The critical line of distinction was not between
425. Id. at 2. As befits the relatively large size and long duration of the convention, the
delegates also selected a doorkeeper and messenger. 15 PA. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 351.
426. See generally 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 8–13, 15–16 (listing rules and
James Madison recounting rulemaking proceedings).
427. E.g., id. at 16 (resolving into committee of the whole).
428. See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) (arguing that standard
Founding-Era methods of interpretation would require that the Constitution be interpreted
according to the understating or the ratifiers, if coherent and available; and if not according to
the original public meaning of the document).
429. Supra note 63 and accompanying text (defining “general convention”).
430. The call to the Philadelphia Price Convention included the southern states of
Maryland and Virginia, but excluded the Carolinas and Georgia. Supra Part III.H.
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general and partial, but between multi-government and intragovernmental. Multi-government conventions were diplomatic meetings
of commissioners empowered by their respective governments, and they
had common characteristics (such as “one committee/one vote”) that
distinguished them from intrastate meetings.
Whether those common characteristics were incorporated into the
Constitution’s phrase “Convention for proposing Amendments”
depends on whether the “Convention for proposing Amendments” was
based on its multi-government predecessors. Put another way, was the
amendments convention to be same sort of entity that prior multigovernment conventions had been? Or did the Framers and Ratifiers
contemplate that the phrase “Convention for proposing Amendments”
might permit procedures and protocols entirely new?
The historical record on this point is nearly as clear as historical
records ever are: The Founders contemplated an amendments
convention fitting the universally-established model.
The first reason for believing this is the fact that there was a
universally-established model. The diplomatic meeting among
committees commissioned by their respective governments was the only
sort of multi-jurisdictional convention—general or partial—known to
the Founders. This model was not only universal but very well
ingrained. As noted throughout Part III, the attendance rosters of these
meetings show considerable overlap, and included many leading
Founders. Among the Framers at the Constitutional Convention, Roger
Sherman of Connecticut was attending his fifth multi-government
convention. Delaware’s John Dickinson was attending his fourth.
Sherman’s Connecticut colleague Oliver Ellsworth, Dickinson’s
colleague George Read, South Carolina’s John Rutledge, and Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts all were attending their third. At least eleven
other Framers were serving at their second: Madison, Franklin,
Washington, Richard Bassett, Elbridge Gerry, Alexander Hamilton,
William C. Houston, William Livingston, Thomas Miflin, Edmund
Randolph, and William Samuel Johnson. These veterans influenced the
Constitution to a degree disproportionate to their numbers,431 and most
were leaders in the ratification debates.

431. Madison is usually accounted the delegate with the most impact. Among other
convention alumni, Washington served as convention president; Gorham chaired the committee
of the whole and was one of five members of the Committee of Detail, which prepared the
Constitution’s first draft; Randolph presented the Virginia Plan and served on the Committee of
Detail; Rutledge chaired that committee; Johnson was on the Committee of Style, which
prepared the final version of the Constitution; Franklin kept the gathering humane and civil; and
Dickinson, Ellsworth, Johnson, and Sherman were all key convention moderates who negotiated
crucial settlements such as the Connecticut [“Great”] Compromise.
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Many other leaders in the ratification debates were veterans of multigovernment conventions as well. Jabez Bowen, a prominent Federalist,
had represented Rhode Island in the New Haven and second Providence
conventions, and he chaired the latter meeting. William Paca of
Maryland, a moderate Anti-Federalist and central figure in the fight for
amendments, had attended the First Continental Congress and the
Philadelphia Price Convention. Thomas McKean, second only to James
Wilson as a Federalist spokesman at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, had served in the Stamp Act Congress and with Paca at the
New Haven and second Providence conclaves. Azor Orne (first
Providence and second Hartford conventions) and Tristam Dalton (first
Providence) served as delegates to the Massachusetts ratifying
convention.432 Finally, ratifiers who had not attended multi-government
gatherings but had served in Congress, in state legislatures, or in state
executive office had been involved in convention selection procedures
or had read convention reports.
Thus the Founders, either by personal experience or second-hand
communication, all were familiar with a single multi-government
model, and knew no other.
Nor did anything in the Constitution suggest that a “Convention for
proposing Amendments” would follow any other than the universallyestablished pattern. The Constitution says nothing to indicate that an
amendments convention would be popularly elected like the House of
Representatives, for example; or that Congress could set the rules or
supervise its composition. On the contrary, where the Constitution does
provide rules it does so precisely in those few areas where existing
practice had permitted variations. This point is explored further below
in the Conclusion.
Those facts should be sufficient to close the question, but there are
still more indicators pointing in the same direction. One of these is the
fundamental reason the convention-proposal method was included in
Article V: as a way of proposing amendments without congressional
interference. If an amendments convention were to follow any model
other than that established by precedent, the model likely would have to
be specified by Congress, presumably as part of the congressional call.
But allowing Congress to determine the composition and rules of the
convention would cede to Congress significant power over the
convention-proposal method, thereby frustrating its central purpose.
Departing from the Founding-Era model, therefore, makes no sense as a
matter of constitutional interpretation.
That Congress would have only a ministerial role in the process was
432. 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1155 (listing Massachusetts ratifying
convention delegates).
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confirmed during the ratification debates by the influential Federalist
Tench Coxe. Through the state application and convention procedure,
he wrote, the states could obtain amendments “although the President,
Senate and Federal House of Representatives, should be unanimously
opposed to each and all of them.”433 This representation was flatly
inconsistent with a power in Congress to manipulate convention
composition or rules.
Madison’s Federalist No. 43 contains a comment also inconsistent
with any but the traditional model. This is the observation that the
Constitution “equally enables the general and the State governments to
originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the
experience on one side, or on the other.”434 Of course, the only way for
the state governments to be “equally enable[d]” with Congress in the
proposal process is if the convention is a meeting of representatives
from those state governments. Mere power to apply for a convention
outside state control would not fit Madison’s criterion.
That the states in convention assembled were the true proposers is
assumed in other ratification-era writings as well. A Federalist writing
as “Cassius” asserted that “the states may propose any alterations which
they see fit, and that Congress shall take measures for having them
433. Tench Coxe, A Friend of Society and Liberty, PA. GAZETTE, July 23, 1788, reprinted
in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 277, 284 (emphasis in original).
434. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 275 (James Madison). Similarly, at the North
Carolina ratifying convention, the following colloquy took place:
Mr. BASS observed, that it was plain that the introduction of amendments
depended altogether on Congress.
Mr. IREDELL replied, that it was very evident that it did not depend on the
will of Congress; for that the legislatures of two thirds of the states were
authorized to make application for calling a convention to propose
amendments, and, on such application, it is provided that Congress shall call
such convention, so that they will have no option.
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 178.
During the debates in New York, John Lansing, Jr., a former delegate to the federal
convention, gave additional reasons for the alternative routes to amendment:
In the one instance we submit the propriety of making amendments to men who
are sent, some of them for six years, from home, and who lose that knowledge
of the wishes of the people by absence, which men more recently from them, in
case of a convention, would naturally possess. Besides, the Congress, if they
propose amendments, can only communicate their reasons to their constituents
by letter, while if the amendments are made by men sent for the express
purpose, when they return from the convention, they can detail more
satisfactorily, and explicitly the reasons that operated in favour of such and
such amendments—and the people will be able to enter into the views of the
convention, and better understand the propriety of acceding to their proposition.
23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2522–24.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

69

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

684

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

carried into effect.”435 Again, for the states to “propose,” the convention
must be their instrumentality. Similarly, Samuel Jones, a supporter of
the Constitution, explained Article V this way:
The reason why there are two modes of obtaining
amendments prescribed by the constitution I suppose to be
this—it could not be known to the framers of the
constitution, whether there was too much power given by it
or too little; they therefore prescribed a mode by which
Congress might procure more, if in the operation of the
government it was found necessary; and they prescribed for
the states a mode of restraining the powers of the
government, if upon trial it should be found they had given
too much.436
Jones thus tells us that the procedure gives the states a “mode of
restraining the powers of government.” The states do not share that
mode with others; the Constitution “prescribe[s]” that they have it. This
can be true only if the convention is their assembly.
Further evidence on the point comes from the spring of 1789, when
the First Federal Congress had assembled, eleven of the original thirteen
states had ratified, but North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet
done so. Those two states, as well as Virginia and New York, were still
unsatisfied with the Constitution as written, and wanted early action on
amendments, particularly a Bill of Rights. Virginia and New York both
applied for a convention to propose amendments.437 The Virginia
application demanded
that a convention be immediately called, of deputies from
the several States, with full power to take into their
consideration the defects of this Constitution that have been
suggested by the State Conventions, and report such
amendments thereto as they shall find best suited to
promote our common interests, and secure to ourselves and
our latest posterity, the great and unalienable rights of
mankind.438
The italicized language reveals the assumption that an amendments
convention was state-based, and was similar to language that long had
435. Cassius VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 511–12 (emphasis added).
436. 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 2520–22 (Feb. 4, 1789) (emphasis
added).
437. See CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 35–39.
438. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 28–29 (1789) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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been used to denominate an interstate convention.439 It paralleled the
language of the Massachusetts application and accompanying letter sent
to Congress in 1785 (“Convention of Delegates from all the States” and
“Convention of the States”).440 Thus, in the view of the Virginia
legislature, the Constitution had not changed the nature of a multigovernment convention.
The New York application similarly asked
that a Convention of Deputies from the several States be
called as early as possible, with full powers to take the said
Constitution into their consideration, and to propose such
amendments thereto, as they shall find best calculated to
promote our common interests, and secure to ourselves and
our latest posterity, the great and unalienable rights of
mankind.441
One might, perhaps, argue that the view of Virginia and New York
were atypical, but in fact they were not. Already quoted have been
several corroborative comments from the ratification debates. The
legislature of Federalist Pennsylvania declined to join the applications
of Virginia and New York, but in its resolution doing so it also assumed
the pre-constitutional model, referring to the proposed gathering as a
convention of the states.442 This remained for many years a common
method of designating an amendments convention.443 Over four decades
later, the Supreme Court still referred to such a gathering an as “a
convention of the states.”444
I have been able to find no Founding-Era evidence suggesting that a
convention for proposing amendments was anything else.

439. E.g., 2 CONN. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 578 (reproducing a resolution of the 1780
Philadelphia Price Convention, referring to it as a “meeting of the several States”).
440. 1784–1785 MASS. RECORDS, supra note 1, at 666 (July 1, 1785) (“Convention of
Delegates from all the States”); id. at 667 (accompanying letter to president of Congress
describing the meeting as a “Convention of the States”).
441. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 29–30 (1789) (emphasis added).
442. William Russell Pullen, The Application Clause of the Amending Provision of the
Constitution 23 (1951) (unpublished dissertation, University of North Carolina) (on file with
University Library, University of North Carolina and with author) (“[T]he calling of a
convention of the states for amending the foederal [sic] constitution.” (quoting MINUTES OF THE
GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PA., 58–61, (1789))). By contrast, a convention within a state was referred
to as a “Convention of the people.” Id. at 26 (quoting a South Carolina report recommending
against applying for an Article V convention).
443. Pullen, supra note 372, at 528; see also Natelson, First Century, supra note 1, at 5, 7,
12 (providing other examples).
444. Smith v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 518, 528 (1831).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

71

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

686

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

CONCLUSION: WHAT PRIOR CONVENTIONS TELL US ABOUT THE
CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS
As noted above, Founding-Era customs assist us in understanding
the attributes and procedures inherent in a “convention for proposing
amendments,” and the powers and prerogatives of the actors in the
process.445 This Conclusion draws on the historical material collected
above, together with the brief constitutional text, to outline those
attributes and procedures.
The previous record of American conventions made it clear that a
convention for proposing amendments was to be, like its immediate
predecessors, an inter-governmental diplomatic gathering—a
“convention of the states” or “convention of committees.” It was to be a
forum in which state delegations could meet on the basis of sovereign
equality. Its purpose is to put the “states in convention assembled” on
equal footing with Congress in proposing amendments.446
Founding-Era practice informs us that Article V applications and
calls may ask for either a plenipotentiary convention or one limited to
pre-defined subjects. Most American multi-government gatherings had
been limited to one or more subjects, and the ratification-era record
shows affirmatively that the Founders expected that most conventions
for proposing amendments would be similarly limited.447 Founding-Era
practice informs us also that commissioners at an amendments
convention were to operate under agency law and remain within the
limits of their commissions.448 Neither the record of Founding Era
conventions nor the ratification debates offer significant support for the
modern claim449 that a convention cannot be limited.
445. Supra notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text.
446. The modern perception that the Constitution does not give the states parity with
Congress in the amendment process has induced some commentators to propose abolishing the
convention system in favor of a system in which a certain number of states directly propose an
amendment by agreeing on its precise language. See, e.g., Why the Medison Amendment?, THE
MADISON AMENDMENT, http://www.madisonamendment.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). A
correct understanding of the convention process makes clear that the states already occupy an
equal position.
447. See Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 727–30.
448. Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
449. Those pressing this claim invariably do so with little or no consideration of either the
prior history of multi-government conventions or the ratification record. See, e.g., Bruce M. Van
Sickle & Lynn M. Boughley, A Lawful and Peaceful Revolution: Article V and Congress’
Present Duty to Call a Convention for Proposing Amendments, 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (1990).
This article does not discuss, or even reference, eighteenth century convention practice, and its
treatment of the “limitability” issue in the ratification record is limited to a single quotation by
Alexander Hamilton. Id. at 32–33 & 45–46. Its principal argument is that the applying states
cannot limit a convention to one subject because the Constitution provides for the convention to
propose “amendments” (plural). Id. at 28, 45. This is like saying that when a speaker seeks
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The only Founding Era efforts to insert in a convention call
prescriptions other than time, place, and subject-matter were abortive.
When Massachusetts presumed to set the voting rules while calling a
third Hartford convention, two of the four states invited refused to
participate.450 In the few instances in which convention calls suggested
how sovereign governments should select their commissioners, some of
those governments disregarded the suggestions, but their commissioners
were seated anyway.451 This record therefore suggests that a convention
call, as the Constitution uses the term, may not include legally-binding
terms other than time, place, and subject. However, the occasional
Founding-Era practice of making calls and applications conditional and
of rescinding them452 suggests that Article V applications and calls also
may be made conditional or rescinded.453 In accordance with FoundingEra practice, states are free to honor or reject calls, as they choose.
Universal pre-constitutional practice tells us that states may select,
commission, instruct, and pay their delegates as they wish, and may
alter their instructions and recall them. Although the states may define
the subject and instruct their commissioners to vote in a certain way, the
convention as a whole makes its own rules, elects its own officers,
establishes and staffs its own committees, and sets its own time of
adjournment.
All Founding-Era conventions were deliberative bodies. This was
true to a certain extent even of conventions whose formal power was
limited to an up-or-down vote. When Rhode Island lawmakers
submitted the Constitution to a statewide referendum in town meetings
rather than to a ratifying convention, a principal criticism was that the
referendum lacked the deliberative qualities of the convention.454 Critics
contended that a ratifying convention, unlike a referendum, provided a
central forum for a full hearing and debate and exchange of information
among people from different locales.455 They further contended that the
“questions” from the audience, if those in the audience have only one question they may not ask
it.
450. Supra Part III.M.
451. Supra Parts III.B (Stamp Act Congress) & III.J (Boston Convention).
452. Supra notes 136, 305, & 310 (conditional calls) and 342 (rescinded call), and
accompanying text.
453. Cf. Natelson, Rules, supra note 1, at 712 (conditions and rescissions probably
permitted).
454. E.g., Report of Rhode Island Legislature, U.S. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1788, reprinted in 24
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 131–32; A Freeman, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, Mar. 15,
1788, reprinted in id. at 137; A Freeman, NEWPORT HERALD, Apr. 3, 1788, reprinted in id. at
220–22; A Rhode Island Landholder, PROVIDENCE U. S. CHRON., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in id.,
at 146–47; Providence Town Meeting: Petition to General Assembly of March 26, U.S. CHRON.,
Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in id. at 193–98.
455. Report of Rhode Island Legislature, U.S. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1788, reprinted in 24
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 131 (stating that the referendum, “though it gave
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convention offered a way to supplement the affirmative or negative vote
with non-binding recommendations for amendments.456
Before and during the Founding Era, American multi-government
conventions enjoyed even more deliberative freedom than ratifying
conventions—as, indeed, befits the dignity of a diplomatic gathering of
sovereignties. No multi-government convention was limited to an up-ordown vote. Each was assigned discrete problems to work on, but within
that sphere each enjoyed freedom to deliberate, advise, consult, confer,
recommend, and propose. Multi-government conventions also could
refuse to propose.457 Essentially, they served as task forces where
delegates from different states could share information, debate, compare
notes, and try to hammer out creative solutions to the problems posed to
them.
History and the constitutional text inform us that a convention for
proposing amendments is, like its direct predecessors, a multigovernment proposing convention. This suggests that an amendments
convention is deliberative in much the same way its predecessors
were.458 This suggests further that when a legislature attempts in its
every person an opportunity to enter his assent or dissent, precluded all the before-mentioned
advantages arising from a general Convention, and excluded the light and information which
one part of the State could afford to the other by means thereof”); Providence Town Meeting:
Petition to General Assembly of March 26, U.S. CHRON., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in id. at 193,
196.
456. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (Apr. 8, 1788), in 24 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 226 (criticizing the referendum because it “precludes every result but
that of a total adoption or rejection”); Report of Rhode Island Legislature, U.S. CHRON., Mar. 6,
1788, reprinted in id. at 132 (stating that Rhode Island lost the opportunity to deliberate at the
Constitutional Convention, and also lost the opportunity to deliberate over amendments at a
ratifying convention); A Rhode Island Landholder, PROVIDENCE U. S. CHRON., Mar. 20, 1788,
reprinted in id. at 146–50; Providence Town Meeting: Petition to General Assembly of March
26, U.S. CHRON., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in id. at 193, 97; see Amendment, PROVIDENCE
GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1788, reprinted in id. at 218.
457. Supra notes 221 and accompanying text See also supra notes 181 & 182 and
accompanying text (relating the York Town convention’s failure to propose). Madison explicitly
recognized an amendments convention’s prerogative not to propose. Letter from James Madison
to Philip Mazzei, Dec. 10, 1788, 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 388, 389 (Robert A.
Rutland & Charles F. Hobson, eds. 1977).
458. Modern case law is consistent in requiring that legislatures and conventions operating
under Article V have some deliberative freedom. See, e.g., Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 226–
27 (1920); Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 1999); Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d
911, 924–25 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 510, 527 (2001); Barker v.
Hazetine, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094 (D.S.D. 1998) (“Without doubt, Initiated Measure 1 brings
to bear an undue influence on South Dakota’s congressional candidates, and the deliberative and
independent amendment process envisioned by the Framers when they drafted Article V is
lost.”); League of Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 58 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v.
Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 127 (Ark. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997) (requiring an
assembly that can engage in “intellectual debate, deliberation, or consideration”); AFL-CIO v.
Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 621–22 (Cal. 1984), stay denied sub nom. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310
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application to compel the convention to merely vote up-or-down on
prescribed language,459 it is not utilizing the application power in a valid
way.
Prevailing convention practice during the Founding Era permitted a
few procedural variations, and it is precisely in these areas that the text
of Article V prescribes procedure. Specifically:
• During the Founding Era, multi-state conventions could be
authorized merely to propose solutions for state approval, or,
less commonly, to resolve issues; in the latter case each state
“pledged its faith” to comply with the outcome. Article V
clarifies that an amendments convention only may propose. At
the Constitutional Convention, the Framers rejected proffered
language to create an amendments convention that could
resolve.460
• During the Founding Era, a proposing convention could be
plenipotentiary or limited. Article V clarifies that neither the
states nor Congress may call plenipotentiary conventions
under Article V, because that Article authorizes only
amendments to “this Constitution,” and, further, it proscribes
certain amendments.461
• During the Founding Era, an “application” for a multigovernment convention could refer either to (1) a request from
a state to Congress to call, or (2) the call itself. Article V
clarifies that an application has only the former meaning.462
• During the Founding Era a call could come from one or more
states, from Congress, or from another convention. Article V
prescribes that the call for an amendments convention comes
only from Congress, but is mandatory when two thirds of the
states have submitted similar applications.463
(1984); State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 829–30 (Mont. 1984); In re Opinion of
the Justices, 167 A. 176, 180 (Me. 1933); cf. Kimble v. Swackhamer, 439 U.S. 1385, 1387
(1978) (Rehnquist, J.), dismissing appeal from 439 U.S. 1041 (upholding a referendum on an
Article V question because it was advisory rather than mandatory); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp.
1291, 1308–09 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Stevens, J.) (upholding a rule of state law on an Article V
assembly, but only because the assembly voluntarily adopted it).
459. E.g., 133 CONG. REC. S4183 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1987) (reproducing Utah application
specifying precise text of amendment).
460. Natelson, Founders’ Plan, supra note 1, at 9.
461. U.S. CONST. art. V (“Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the
Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”).
462. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[O]n the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, [Congress] shall call.”).
463. U.S. CONST. art. V (“or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, [Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments”).
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• During the Founding Era, one proposing convention (that of
1787) had attempted to specify how the states were to review
its recommendations. Article V clarifies that an amendments
convention does not have this power.464
Thus do text and history fit together to guide us in the use of
Article V.

464. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[Congress’s call for a convention], in either Case, shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Convention in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

76

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

691

Appendix A

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

77

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

692

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

78

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

693

79

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

694

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

80

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

695

81

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

696

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

82

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

697

83

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

698

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

84

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

699

85

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

700

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

86

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

701

Appendix B

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

87

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

702

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

88

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

703

89

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

704

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

90

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

705

91

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

706

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

92

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

707

93

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

708

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

94

Natelson: Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “C

2013]

THE CONSTITUTION’S “CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS”

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

709

95

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1

710

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/1

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

96

